University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
12-2012

Mapping Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Modeling Spatial
Relationships between Group Grievances and Opportunities to
Measure the Propensity for Xenophobic Violence
Eric Holder
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the African Studies Commons, Geographic Information Sciences Commons, and the Human
Geography Commons

Citation
Holder, E. (2012). Mapping Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Modeling Spatial Relationships between
Group Grievances and Opportunities to Measure the Propensity for Xenophobic Violence. Graduate
Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/622

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Mapping Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Modeling Spatial Relationships between Group
Grievances and Opportunities to Measure the Propensity for Xenophobic Violence

Mapping Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Modeling Spatial Relationships between Group
Grievances and Opportunities to Measure the Propensity for Xenophobic Violence

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Geography

By

Eric Matthew Holder
Ouachita Baptist University
Bachelor of Arts in Biology, 2005

December 2012
University of Arkansas

ABSTRACT
Xenophobia can be defined as the hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers or of their politics or
culture (Ngwane et al., 2008). This sentiment reached its tipping point in urban areas across the Republic
of South Africa in May 2008 when mass, widespread and systematic attacks against African nonnationals took place across the country. Although previous research agrees on who played the various
roles during this crisis event (Everatt, 2010), little research has been carried out to create a predictive
model to assess where future violence could occur based on a set of conflict indicators. The purpose of
this research is to revisit the sociopolitical, geographical and geopolitical landscape of the Republic of
South Africa during the year preceding the violence of May 2008 to identify the conflict indicators that
worked towards triggering the violence. Once these indicators are identified, they will be geospatially
represented through a series of quantitative thematic maps.
Findings from this research reveal that there is a positive correlation between conflict indicators
and large xenophobic events and the importance of this research lies in its ability to serve as the basis for
a conflict prediction model. The ability to geospatially represent the conflict indicators that served to
exacerbate xenophobic tensions across the Republic of South Africa leading up to the violence of May
2008 can be duplicated today to identify the geographic locations that are most susceptible to experience
a large xenophobic event.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Relations between South African nationals and African non-nationals during the post-Apartheid era
are a striking case of narcissism of minor differences. Immigrants are sources of fear and anxieties the
more they are imagined as invisible intruders (Matsinhe, 2011). At times, differences between the two
groups can seem impossible to differentiate and often go unnoticed. Under the correct set of
circumstances, however, the differences can be perceived as very real and very threatening. Othering is
a fundamental process in identity politics within the new South Africa. The process of othering involves
the identification of socially constructed markers by which the individual can be distanced from a group.
The distancing between ―us‖ and ―them‖ has gained increasing attention amongst populations of South
African nationals and non-nationals through the form of xenophobia. In the post-Apartheid era of South
Africa, identity politics and formation is still relatively young.
Xenophobia is to othering as the chicken is to the egg. One quite simply cannot exist without the
other. Xenophobia amounts to violent harassment of immigrants from other countries in Africa, killing
―tens, if not thousands‖ (Danso, McDonald 2001). There exists an exhaustive record supporting the fact
that migrants have been targeted as ―others‖ and blamed for many social ills (Dodson 2000). The blame
is often administered through violent means.
It took fourteen years from the fall of the Apartheid regime in 1994 for a significant xenophobic event
to occur. During the winter of 2008, the process of othering took on the heinous form of coordinated and
systematic attacks by South African nationals against African non-nationals. The wave of violence left
scores of innocent men and women dead, thousands displaced from their homes and millions of rands in
vandalized, destroyed and looted property and possessions. The violence was mostly seen in highly
urbanized cities and surrounding townships, where overcrowding and group grievances were highest.
The response of the government to the violence was slow at best, and one of widespread denial. Though
many researchers and institutions predicted the inevitable violence, those most at risk had very little hope
for protection, aid relief and relocation placing heavy burden on an already brittle infrastructure. Prior to
the May attacks, all evidence pointed towards the inevitability of ―when‖ and not ―if‖ a significant act of
violence would occur. Four years later, the inevitability of similar violent civil conflict remains.
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The objectives of this study are to 1) identify the significant causes of xenophobic conflict as seen in
the May 2008 attacks, 2) create a series of group grievance and opportunity maps to cartographically
represent the significant causes of xenophobic conflict, and 3) identify significant spatial relationships
between the conflict triggers and the number of xenophobic events to serve as the basis of a conflict
prediction model. These relationships will serve to answer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Geostatistically representing the primary conflict triggers of the May 2008 xenophobic
violence is an effective method in measuring the propensity of xenophobic violence in South Africa.
Xenophobic tensions are as high today as they were prior to the May 2008 attacks. It is vitally
important for continued research to be conducted in studying the correlations between significant
xenophobic events within the Republic of South Africa and effectiveness of its government to rule.
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Pre-1994 Migratory Patterns
The Afrikaans word for ―separateness‖, apartheid truly was that in every sense. Apartheid was ―an
enormously complex, sophisticated, and modern system of racial and economic domination that
employed the most advanced technology, much of it obtained from the West, to regulate the life and work
of millions of people‖ (North, 1986). Prior to 1994, a white minority population governed the Republic of
South Africa by controlling the geography of the country. In most part, this was accomplished through
dividing the country along lines of skin colour by forcibly relocating millions of non-whites from their
homes and into designated areas deemed appropriate by the white minority rule.
Apartheid forced nearly four million non-white, non-European persons out of their homes and
homelands into regulated territories. Those displaced were located to homelands or ―Bantustans‖. As
the central institution of apartheid, the Bantustan system divided South Africans among ten geographic
territories, which Desmond Tutu, the former Archbishop of Cape Town, called resettlement camps
(Hawes, 2009). These homelands were mostly classified by tribal group and successfully allowed the
white minority rule of South Africa to effectively ―divide and conquer‖ by dividing the non-white majority of
the population into smaller more controllable groups along lines of subtle differences such as mother
tongue language, culture and religion. Non-whites were strictly monitored and their movement controlled.
Unemployment amongst non-whites was staggeringly high with exception within the mining and
service industries. However, as demand for labour increased within these industries, especially the
mining industry, the demand for cheap, foreign labour also increased. This demand would be met by the
far-reaching influx of non-national immigrants from many sub-Saharan African countries. The movement
of people before 1994 was very different from the movements of people occurring today. There was a
great ease of movement of people under the apartheid regime across permeable or semi-permeable
th

th

borders due to the Regional Labour Market System (RLMS). Set up in the 19 and 20 centuries, the
RLMS was a co-operation between South Africa and the British and Portuguese colonial governments,
and included many of today‘s Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. Its sole
purpose was to develop a strong work force from neighboring countries to be brought into South Africa to
3

specifically work in the South African mining industry (Muanamoha, 2010). The RLMS was so successful
in fact that throughout the years, South African mines became highly dependent on cheap male migrant
labour from its neighboring countries. South African employers systematically recruited foreign migrants
to supplement what they deemed to be an insufficient supply of cheap domestic labour (Southall, 1994).
The influx of mostly black African non-nationals into the country served as a significant proportion of the
work force that fuelled the South African economy. The apartheid regime readily accepted black migrant
workers into the country for the sole purpose of procuring valuable minerals from the mines while strictly
denying the entry of black asylum seekers and refugees.
In contrast, the apartheid government opened its borders to whites leaving de-colonizing countries
across the region during the latter part of the twentieth century, often when they did not meet the terms of
immigration legislation (Peberdy, 2010). For more than a century, migrants to South Africa consisted
largely of impoverished rural dwellers from the surrounding peripheries desperately seeking employment
on almost any terms (Murray, 2003).
It would become apparent to Africans living in colonies across sub-Saharan Africa that employment
opportunities were limited in their home countries. Displaced from their land by their colonizers, many
migrated south to the mines of South Africa (Jones, 2006) and though asylum seekers and refugees were
denied legal entry into the country, the South African government could do little to deter the illegal
movement of peoples across borders. In fact, illegal immigration was subtly encouraged for years
(Muanamoha, 2010). This deliberate choice to look the other way in regards to illegal immigration did at
times have undesirable consequences. Such a rapid influx of immigrants over a relatively short amount
of time caused the apartheid regime to, at the very least, provide accommodations for the migrant
workers.
Another concern that emerged was one of health, more specifically disease transmission propagated
by migrant workers. As South Africa‘s mining capacities grew, such as its gold mining industry along the
Witwatersrand, the impact on patterns of sickness and health grew as well causing great concern among
those running the industry as well as those participating in its operation (Packard, 1987). These concerns
quickly evolved into and exacerbated tensions between native South African labourers and other African
4

non-nationals. Money the migrant labourers brought home was usually far above the average rural
income, which often led to conspicuous consumption and spending. In this way, migrants became a big
attraction to women in the villages and it was therefore believed then that HIV/AIDS would spread rapidly
if these men and women were carriers or sufferers (Chirwa, 1998). The position changed in October,
1987 when the South African government heavily influenced by ultra-rightist white elements in the
Conservative Party, issued a declaration prohibiting HIV carriers and AIDS sufferers from immigrating into
the country (Chirwa, 1998). Those already in the country would possibly be deported. It became an
offence for an individual or institution to knowingly abet an HIV carrier or AIDS sufferer to enter or stay in
the country. All those immigrating to South Africa to work or study had to carry an HIV-free certificate
issued within 14 days prior of their entry into the country (Chirwa, 1998). As a result of the growing
tensions between migrant workers and South African nationals, the government even went so far as to
threaten to expel 1.5 million foreign workers.
Migrant labourers were also used as a political tool against countries that hosted the African National
Congress (ANC). For example, in the late eighties, the South African government expelled some 60,000
Mozambican workers for a landmine blast on the Mozambican/South Africa border that was blamed on
the ANC (Chirwa, 1998). The apartheid regime exercised with stringent consistency the same
segregatory policies towards those wishing to enter the country and those who already had. Whites who
left Mozambique at independence were welcomed in South Africa and given permanent residence
whereas black Mozambicans who fled the civil war of the late eighties and nineties were not, entering the
country as undocumented migrants (Peberdy, 2010). A century of lax immigration policies coupled with
growing tensions between nationals and non-nationals would begin to change the composition of
demographics within the country. One of the legacies of apartheid, ―institutionalized othering‖, has been
viewed by many as the driving force behind today‘s urban violence as well as a strong catalyst for intergroup grievances and tensions that are deeply entrenched across the geographic and sociopolitical
landscapes.

5

Post-1994 Migratory Patterns
By far the most significant change in cross-border migration in South Africa in the 1990s has been the
dramatic increase in noncontract migration. Africans from other parts of the continent – mostly from the
immediate region but now from as far away as Ghana and Somalia – are entering South Africa in
increasing numbers to look for work, to visit friends, and to sell and buy goods (McDonald, 2000).
Documented border crossings from countries in the SADC alone have increased almost seven-fold to 3
million visitors a year since 1990, and there are also significant increases in the number of visitors from
Eastern Europe and Asia. Undocumented migration would appear to have increased dramatically as
well. Estimates range from 2.5 to 12 million undocumented migrants living in the country at any one time
(out of a total South African population of approximately 38 million), and although these figures are most
likely exaggerated there can be little doubt that there has been a significant increase in the number of
people overstaying their visas and entering the country without proper documentation (McDonald, 2000).
At the risk of over-simplifying a long history of scholarly research on the subject, it can be said that the
bulk of the literature on cross-border migration in the region paints a very negative picture of the
consequences of migratory labor and apartheid-era immigration laws (McDonald, 2000). This is not to
suggest that all cross-border (Figure 1.) movement has been seen to be negative or that it affects all
people in the same way, but the overwhelming sense from the literature is that cross-border movement
has had a deleterious impact on individuals, families, communities and states in the region (McDonald,
2000).
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Figure 1. South Africa‘s Contiguous Neighbors.
Past research points to three stages of immigration into and within the Republic of South Africa, and it
is the cumulative effect of all three that have shaped the geographic landscape as it is known today.
Those stages are 1) mining and agriculture sector, 2) Apartheid-era, and 3) Post-Apartheid era migration
(Muanamhola, 2010). After decades of white minority rule, the apartheid regime ended on April 27, 1994
and would have tremendous ramifications on the demographic landscape throughout the country. Yet
unlike earlier patterns of labour migration, a large percentage of recent immigrants have come from cities
in other parts of Africa, and they have largely gravitated to the urban areas in South Africa (Murray,
2003). The ―urban-to-urban‖ movement marks a distinctive shift in the historical pattern of labour
migration to South Africa (Murray, 2003). The years leading up to April 27, 1994 were signified by the
relative ease and rapid influx of African non-nationals into the country primarily to serve the growing
needs of the mining industry. In contrast, however, the years following apartheid would be signified with
border posts closing, strict enforcing of immigration legislation, and waves of internal migration within the
former apartheid-instituted Bantustans. It is likely that the 1990s will be remembered as the decade in
which migration in southern Africa became a critical challenge for the governments of the region.
7

The years since the democratic victory of the ANC in 1994 have witnessed unprecedented population
movements, with a strong and seemingly underterrable influx of immigrants into South Africa (Marion,
1998). At the outset, the new ANC government granted amnesty to many unauthorized immigrants
wishing to remain in the country, promised to relax the stringent and racially biased immigrant policies
that had prevailed under white minority rule, and vowed to protect the rights of immigrants who, in
increasing numbers, have sought refuge, legally or illegally, in South Africa (Murray, 2003). According to
Human Rights Watch (HRW), police in South Africa arrest more people for violating immigration laws
each year than for any other reason (Murray, 2003).
As apartheid fell, and the new South Africa came into being, thousands of already-illegal and legal
immigrants were granted amnesty to remain within the country (Murray, 2003). This pool of amnesty
recipients included nationals from countries that gave refuge to tens of thousands of black South Africans,
as well as political support to the ANC during the years of apartheid, and as a consequence, suffered
considerable economic hardship and war inflicted devastation (Murray, 2003). As South Africa has now
tightened its borders to prevent apartheid-era numbers of these migrants from accessing the country, the
source countries of what once sent thousands into South Africa are particularly resentful at the rejection
they now face (Murray, 2003). Apartheid-era immigration laws remain in force in South Africa today
(Crush, 2001), but there have been steps made by the government to acknowledge and protect those
entering its borders. The 1997 Green Paper; the first ever refugee protection legislation in South Africa‘s
history, recommended the development of a framework specific to refugee protection. The 2008
Refugees Amendment Act (Act No. 33), an amended act of the previous act of 1998 (Handmaker, 2001)
affords protection to asylum seekers to South Africa. Asylum seekers and refugees have the right to
work, study and access medical treatment as if they were South African nationals (Peberdy, 2010).
Two types of migratory patterns signify the post-1994 demographic landscape of South Africa,
internal migration consisting of groups of people who for decades were isolated to their respective
homelands, and external migration consisting of African non-nationals immigrating from other countries
across sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. Figure 2. offers a glimpse of how drastically the
demographics within South Africa‘s mining industry changed during the first decade of an apartheid-free
8

South Africa. Three of the four largest source countries of labour, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
saw a relatively steady decline in employment of its nationals within gold mines in South Africa. This is
partly a result of the application of more liberal immigration policies at points of entry and partly as a result
of the shifting away from contract labour within South Africa‘s mining industry (Peberdy, 2010).
200000
180000
160000
140000
South Africa

120000

Botswana

100000

Lesotho

80000

Mozambique

60000

Swaziland

40000
20000
0
1990

1995

2000

2005

Figure 2. Mine Labour Employment on the Gold Mines, 1990-2006 (Peberdy, 2010).
There are no reliable methodologies available for determining the actual number of foreign
immigrants and migrants in South Africa today (Murray, 2003). But what is not disputable is that the
number of illegal immigrants deported has dramatically increased, from an estimated 90,000 in 1994, to
around 200,000 in 2000 (Murray, 2003). Equally astounding is the fact that illegal immigrants were
deported to at least ninety-two countries throughout the world in 2000 (Murray, 2003). As time passes,
and as experience from around the world shows, human population movements continue in spite of state
controls, a pattern which given the historical fact that migration has a fundamental feature of society long
before state systems were imposed, will in all likelihood persist indefinitely in South Africa (Marion, 1998).
The distance-decay relationship of inter-national and intra-national migration has weakened considerably
since 1994, and as such monitoring South Africa‘s borders is proving to be a labour and resourceintensive task for the government.
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South Africa shares 7,000km of land borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique,
Swaziland and Lesotho. The Zimbabwean and Mozambican borders are protected by 220km of
potentially lethal electric fence that runs intermittently along the border (Peberdy, 2010). Importantly for
regional migrants entry has been made harder as the number of land border posts was reduced from 52
to 19 between 1994 and 1997 (Peberdy, 2010). The steps the South African government has taken to
slow the influx of immigration can do little to prevent the millions of non-nationals that cross its borders
every year. Figure 3. shows the total number of border crossings between the years 1996-2005
(Peberdy, 2010).
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Figure 3. Total Border Crossings, 1996-2005 (Peberdy, 2010).
It is impossible to know how many foreigners are in South Africa at any one time as official data can
be difficult to interpret. It is possible to determine in what capacity migrants are entering the country.
There has been a significant increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees from the rest of the
continent and further a field during the years after apartheid, as well as an increased movement of visitors
and cross-border traders from the region. To contrast this increase in movement types, there has been a
significant decrease in the number of contract workers within South Africa‘s mining industries. There has
also been a significant fall in the number of permanent residence awards given out (Figure 4.), as well as
a significant but unknown increase in the number of Zimbabweans entering the country (Peberdy, 2010).
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Figure 4. Approved Applications for Permanent Residence, 1990-2005 (Peberdy, 2010).
Inter-Provincial Migration
A stark example of intra-provincial migration within the country is that which John Western refers to
as the ―Africanization of the Cape‖ (Western, 2001). After apartheid fell, so too did the restrictions that for
generations segregated black South Africans to their homelands. A region that had been off limits to
black migration throughout the apartheid years was the Western Cape. Historically the Western Cape
had been home to the Cape Coloured people but as apartheid crumbled, so too did the restrictions
keeping out non-whites from the area. Western writes, ―…at the southern tip of Africa, the culmination of
one of the world‘s largest population shifts is there for the witnessing‖ (Western, 2001). The population
shift is so great that the population within the metropolitan areas of the Western Cape has more than
doubled in the last thirty years.
The Cape Coloured people had lived in the region for hundreds of years and had been unable to
migrate with ease to other regions of the country because of the Bantustan system. With the removal of
this system, the millennium long southward migration of Bantu-speaking people originally from north of
the equator finally arrived in the Cape (Western, 2001).
Feeling boxed into the continent‘s southwestern most corner, the large influx of immigrants into the
region has caused great concern among the Cape Coloured community. The Cape Coloured are direct
descendants of the amalgam that proceeded from the Dutch East India Company‘s establishment of
11

Cape Town in 1652 (Western, 2001), a date that far precedes the date the first Bantu-speaking travelers
arrived. Yet, many are those who wish to defend their own ―Coloured‖ interests wherein many contend
that one of those interests is evidently ―their little bit of the world‖, their southwestern corner of South
Africa; their veritable Capeness, for the Cape Coloured do not exist anywhere else in the world (Western,
2001). As today‘s population at the Cape, the Cape Coloured are in themselves the product of
dispossession in that they are very much and completely a new amalgam of the local, the imported, and
the invading European dispossessors. Yet ―South African‖ in the minds of many Cape Coloured comes to
be interpreted as ―Black African‖; those who were once termed ―Natives‖ and those who outnumbered
Coloureds nine to one in the country (Western, 2001).
It is this highly contested definition of what it means to be South African in a post-apartheid South
Africa that is the basis for much debate and conflict across all levels, for during the apartheid years, the
sociopolitical hierarchy within the country was as follows: 1) White, 2) non-White (including Coloured and
Indian/Asian), and 3) Black. Eighteen years has passed and the sociopolitical hierarchy within the
country has changed to: 1) Black, 2) Coloured/Indian/Asian, and 3) White. The non-White, or Coloured,
those of mixed race and Asian descent, finds themselves in exactly the same sociopolitical level of
influence as they had been in for decades. Before 1991, the demographics within Cape Town, the largest
city in the Western Cape, primarily consisted of Coloureds and Whites, with a minimal representation of
Black Africans (Western, 2001). The primary cause of the rapid migration of black South Africans into the
Western Cape is the ease of movement afforded to South Africans, black, white, and Coloured.
According to neoclassical migration theory, labor migration is likely to occur in such an environment as a
result in differences in location-specific employment opportunities or wages (Zuberi, 2004). This is
especially true in this case. In 1999 official government statistics had the Western Cape experiencing a
poverty rate of 28%, whereas that of the Eastern Cape was the nation‘s highest, at 71% (Western, 2001).
From 1982 to 1992 the Black African population of Cape Town more than doubled, nearly all the
newcomers Xhosa people from the former homelands of the Ciskei and Transkei (Western, 2001). The
Western and Eastern Cape respectively, then, stood at ―Second World‖ vs. ―Third World‖ levels (Figure
5.).
12

Figure 5. Western and Eastern Cape
External In-Migration
One of the most significant changes in patterns of migration since 1994 is the arrival of asylum
seekers and refugees from the rest of the continent as well as from overseas (Peberdy, 2010). The
largest claimant-generating countries between 1994 – 2001 were: Angola, Burundi, Zaire (Democratic
Republic of the Congo) and Somalia (Peberdy, 2010). Figure 6. shows the total number of refugee
applications by country of origin in 2006.
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Figure 6. Refugee applications by country of origin, 2006 (Peberdy, 2010).
Contemporary movements of people to South Africa are characterized by considerable diversity of
purpose and heterogeneity of social composition. While some migration is random, most of it is not.
Migrants tend to follow specific paths and move along particular trajectories (Murray, 2003). Neither the
international borders nor the immigration laws of the Republic of South Africa can halt the present
permeation of foreign clandestine immigrants from African lands to the north. They are leaving behind
not only the economic incapacity of African states in the north but also their societal horror: political
oppression, ethnic discrimination, civil war, and genocide. South Africa for them is quite simply the most
immediately available destination (Western, 2001). Upon arrival, these groups quickly form strong bonds
amongst others of similar flight forming an African Diaspora spread throughout the country but clustered
in and around South Africa‘s larger, urban centres. Studies reveal, for example, that the provinces of
Gauteng and Mpumalanga are two choice immigration centres for Mozambicans (Muanamoha, 2010).
Kinship, common language, and religious affiliations might be operative at home, but in South Africa,
migrants seek wider connections rooted in shared regional origins or nationality (Murray, 2003).
14

Immigrant transnational communities create new forms of vernacular cosmopolitanism whose
manifestations no longer refer to the acquisition of an identity through full assimilation to a new cultural
milieu but rather to the maintenance of a hybrid, syncretic identity neither ―here‖ nor ―there‖ (Murray,
2003). Whereas people of African descent were permitted to enter the country prior to 1994 solely as
contract workers in the mining and agricultural sectors of the economy, current immigration laws are
designed to attract skilled foreign workers. In fact, the reality that thousands of undocumented
immigrants are believed to be working in the country today implies that legal status does not necessarily
place a constraint on a person‘s ability to get a job (Zuberi, 2004).
The attempt to account for and monitor the activity of immigrants within the borders of South Africa is
virtually impossible, but attempts have been made. The Southern African Migration System (SAMS)
exists among countries with close historical, political, cultural, and economic ties. This migration system
primarily covers a subset of SADC members including: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Figure 7. below). Findings from the SAMS indicated that by
the mid 80‘s, there were over 100,000 immigrants from neighboring countries working in South Africa‘s
mining industry (Zuberi, 2004).

Figure 7. SAMS Members, 2004
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In addition immigrants belonging to SADC nations do not require visas to enter South Africa, and many of
them have social networks in South Africa that they can use to enter the country legally or illegally. It is
likely that some SADC citizens take advantage of these conditions to migrate and search for work in
South Africa even if they are undocumented.
Conflict Triggers
a. Othering
Othering is an inherently human condition, one that has been seen in many historic cases where
groups undergoing ―diminishing contrasts‖ yet engaging in one-sided exaggeration of the same
increasingly diminishing contrasts, often resulting in group conflict. There are many examples of historic
―othering‖ events through group conflict, from the discrimination against the Burakumin in Japan, the
violence against blacks in the American South following the abolition of slavery, the violence between
equals among the court nobility in France and Germany, the growth of anti-Semitism in Germany, the civil
war in the Balkans, and the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda (Matsinhe, 2011). Inter-group conflict in the new
South Africa is a complex and highly debated phenomenon.
In order to understand conflict in terms of how to prevent it, it is vital to identify the triggers of the
conflict. Consistent with this statement is a tradition of research on group conflict that suggests group
pride – whether ethnic, national, or gender based is the positive half of prejudice. De Figueiredo and
Elkins‘ research on group conflict dynamics asks whether group pride or ―particularism‖ is the solution to
ethnocentrism, or its very embodiment (de Figueiredo, 2003). They focus on a specific kind of ingroup/out-group relationship, attitudes toward one‘s nation and attitudes toward immigrants to that nation,
where each is defined in terms of the ―other‖, meaning nationalists are defined in relation to non-nationals
and immigrants are defined in relation to nationalists (de Figueiredo, 2003). Their research reveals that
comparisons to another are central to group identity studies and that the prevailing approach of the study
of ethnocentrism, in-group bias, and prejudice, presumes that in-group love and out-group hate are
reciprocally related. Ethnocentrism states that there must be loyalty to the group, brotherhood within, and
hatred and contempt for ―the other‖ (de Figueiredo, 2003). Ethnocentrism gives rise to the patriot and the
national, strengthening the identity of the in-group by defining it for what it is not.
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The main difference between nationalism and patriotism is that patriotism is self-referential whereas
nationalism is comparative, in fact mostly downwardly comparative. The established often imagine the
physical aspect of the outsiders as marks of their inferiority, thus setting them apart as fundamentally
different, a part of a collective fantasy evolved by the established group (Elias, 1994). During apartheid,
the asymmetric power between the two groups of White and non-White was so great that the weaker
group began to measure themselves with the yardstick of their oppressors (Elias, 1994). This inter-group
dynamic exacerbated the apartheid-era culture of domination. A culture of domination is self-perpetuating
and requires the presence of the ―other‖ to dominate, whether the ―other‖ is white or black. The challenge
in a post-apartheid South Africa rests on the responsibility to use power and influence in a markedly
different manner than the way it was wielded by the deposed oppressors (Jones, 2006). To quote
Mamdani, ―The political world set in motion by the modern state and modern colonialism generates
subaltern identities endlessly, in binary pairs. We need to break out of the worldview of not only the cat,
but also the rat, not only the settler but also the native. Unless we can break out of the worldview of the
rat, post-colonialism will remain a purgatory punctuated by non-revolutionary violence‖ (Mamdani, 2001).
There is a combination of elements from studies on state violence that uncovers a postcolonial
equation in which the colonized ―other‖ transmogrifies into a hated ―self‖, which then is projected on to an
imagined ―other‖ (Ngugi, 1997; Soyinka, W). Because of their dress, mannerisms, and language
differences some immigrants, particularly from West African countries are distinguishable from black
South Africans, and immigrants from central and western African are more readily identifiable as a foreign
―other‖ (Murray, 2003). The naming of others is a key component in the relationship between the politics
of identity and the attachment to place in contemporary nation-states (Murray, 2003).
b. A Perceived Threat
For conflict to fully manifest itself there generally needs to exist more than just the passion and zeal
for one‘s country. A study by Feldman and Stenner (1997) suggests that authoritarian traits manifest
themselves in intolerance or hostility only under a certain set of conditions, in particular the presence of a
perceived threat (de Figueiredo, 2003). This is just the case in urban centres with active immigrant
communities in South Africa where African non-nationals are viewed as the perceived threat by a majority
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black South African nationalistic rhetoric. This staunch nationalism can be traced back to the replication
of imperialist processes of cultural reitification and binarization (Appiah, 1992). It has been well
documented that immigrants, legal and illegal, are viewed as a threatening presence to a segment of the
majority black South African population. Migrant workers and mobile ethnic groups are often cited as the
major vectors of infectious diseases while foreign workers and hawkers are viewed as a threat to the local
population because they compete for the available jobs, commodity markets and other facilities (Chirwa,
1998). Those who see themselves aggrieved choose an enemy that is perceived both as gaining
undeserved advantages and as marginal, and hence socially vulnerable (Murray, 2003).
c. Youth Bulges
Recent research has revealed emerging interests in macro-demographic triggers of conflict such as
migration, ethnic group dynamics, and youth bulges, referring to the number of young persons in a
population (Urdal, 2004; Urdal, 2005; Urdal, 2006). The first comparative empirical study of the role of
youth bulges in armed conflict was undertaken by Nazli Choucri (1974). By comparing qualitative case
studies of 45 ‗local conflicts‘ but not comparing these with any control cases, she found that the existence
of large youth cohorts did play a minor role in ten conflicts, but was never a crucial factor in the initiation
of these conflicts. In his studies on the demography of conflict and violence, Henrik Urdal suggests that
micro-demographic triggers such as total population, high population pressure on potentially arable land,
and large refugee populations must also include a macro-demographic trigger for conflict to occur (Urdal,
2005). In an empirical test of these propositions, the study suggests that youth bulges are particularly
associated with an increasingly high risk of internal conflict in starkly autocratic regimes, but a similar
effect is also found for highly democratic countries (Urdal, 2006). Urdal‘s research on youth bulges
focuses on whether youth bulges may increase the risk of three different forms of internal political
violence: armed conflict, terrorism and riots (Urdal, 2006). This study adds to the existing literature on the
demography of conflict in several ways. It discusses how youth bulges may affect the risk of political
violence, drawing on two prominent theoretical perspectives concerning opportunity versus motive for civil
war, as well as on recent advances in economic demography, to identify a possible causal explanation for
why cohort size in itself may influence the propensity for political violence (Urdal, 2006; Urdal, 2004).
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While previous studies have tested the youth bulge hypothesis for high-intensity civil wars, this
research studies new low-intensity conflict data and finds robust support for a relationship. Urdal
identifies relevant contextual factors believed to interact with youth bulges to increase the risk of political
violence and tests these propositions empirically. He provides the first empirical results suggesting that
youth bulges may also increase the risk of terrorism and more spontaneous forms of political violence like
riots, and violent demonstrations. It is suggested that youth bulges may be a better predictor of low
intensity political violence than large-scale wars (Urdal, 2006). Rapid population growth together with the
lack of unemployment opportunities for youths, rather than environmental degradation, represents a
considerable risk of civil violence and ―failed states‖ (Ware, 2005). Research shows that during times of
political instability, the risk of large-scale violent dissent increases substantially (Carey, 2007).
It has been argued that high unemployment among educated youth is one of the most destabilizing
and potentially violent sociopolitical phenomena in any regime (Braungart, 1984; Winckler, 2002). It's not
enough to increase level of education of cohorts, but to then be able to successfully transition these
educated individuals into the labour market. Huntington argues that societies are particularly conflict
prone when the number of young people aged fifteen to twenty-four reaches a ‗‗critical level‘‘ of 20% of
the overall population in a country (Huntington, 1996).
It is argued that a large population makes it more difficult for regimes to keep tight control (Fearon &
Laitin, 2003). Identifying the structural causes of political violence potentially enables us to reduce the
risk factors (Urdal, 2006). One of the leading theorists on the role of youth in political violence, Jack A.
Goldstone, claims that youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded
history and the existence of large youth bulges have historically been associated with times of political
crisis (Goldstone, 2001). Among prominent historical events that have been linked to the existence of
youth bulges is the role played by the historically large youth cohorts (caused by the rapid decline in
infant mortality some 20 to30 years earlier) in the French revolution of 1789, and the importance of the
economic depression hitting the largest German youth cohorts in explaining the rise of Nazism in
Germany in the 1930s (Moller, 1968; Urdal, 2004). Figure 8. provides a model for the assumed
relationship between youth bulges and armed conflict as put forward by Urdal. The model assumes that
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youth bulges are likely to experience unemployment because they increase the supply of labor
substantially when entering the labor market.

Figure 8. Youth Bulges as a Source of Armed Conflict (Urdal, 2004).
Generations that are considerably larger than their parents‘ generations are likely to run into several
societal ‗bottlenecks‘, straining social institutions. Most theoretical works concerned with youth bulges
point to limited absorption capacity of the labor market as the most important factor for causing
grievances among youth. Unemployment in any society weakens the political system‘s legitimacy and
stability. Such conditions produce a climate of radicalism particularly among unattached youth who have
the least to lose in the gamble and struggle for revolutionary gain (Braungart,1984; Urdal, 2004).
A second hypothesis Urdal‘s research tests is the less economic growth a country experiences, the
stronger is the conflict conducive effect of youth bulges. Well-educated youth have often been observed
in central positions in episodes of riots, from the streets of Jakarta and Teheran, to Belgrade and Harare
demanding democratic reforms. One reason why students would want to revolt is if their aspirations of
employment and political influence are not met. Choucri speculates, ―the greater the unemployment
among educated youth, the greater the propensity for dissatisfactions, instability, and violence‖ (Choucri,
1974; Urdal, 2004).
The underlying argument of why youth bulges create opportunities for violent conflict lies in the sheer
number of individuals that make up the bulge. Relative to previous generations, the pool of potential
rebels increases and, since large youth cohorts stretch the limits of social institutions such as the labor
market, youth bulges in themselves are likely to produce more aggrieved individuals. In addition to being
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more open to change, young people generally have fewer responsibilities for families and careers and are
free of constraints that tend to make activism too time consuming or risky for other groups to engage in
(Goldstone, 1999). Some empirical evidence suggests that ethnicity is the form of social segmentation
that is most likely to be transformed into violent conflict as a result of the existence of youth bulges.
Huntington argues that the existence of large youth bulges account for many of the inter-civilizational
conflicts in the late twentieth century. He holds that the most serious episodes of ethnic violence in Sri
Lanka occurred during periods when the rioting ethnic groups had their youth bulge peaks (Huntington,
1996). Subsequent research validates these findings by revealing a significant correlation between risk of
ethnic conflict and youth bulge presence (Esty et al., 1998).
Past research reveals, however, that the presence of a significant youth bulge alone is not enough to
directly influence inter-group conflict. It has been discovered that an auxiliary set of triggers must be
present within a youth bulge for the successful transition of aggrieved youth to rebellious youth to occur.
The first trigger is relative deprivation. A gap must exist between what a group believes it should possess
and what it actually possesses. The second trigger is a strong collective identity amongst the deprived,
and the third trigger is poor service delivery by the government (Urdal, 2004). It is the combination of
these three triggers together with the presence of a large youth bulge that significantly increases a
region‘s susceptibility for internal armed conflict.
Moving beyond demographics as a primary contributor for conflict, there exists an exhaustive list of
research devoted towards the analysis of development within a society as causal towards violent conflict
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; de Soysa, 2002; Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001; Hegre et al., 2001; Henderson &
Singer, 2000). Sen argues that mortality is a strong indicator of a country‘s level of development,
specifically infant mortality (Sen, 1998). The level of infant mortality in a society is highly dependent on
both material living standards, levels of education, gender inequalities and health care systems.
These factors provide evidence that the combination of youth bulges and poor economic performance
can be explosive. This is bad news for regions that currently exhibit both features to a large extent, often
in coexistence with intermediary and unstable political regimes, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Arab world (Urdal, 2004).
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The work of human geographers can be grouped into two widely accepted traditions of conflict study.
The first tradition, often coined the ―greed‖ perspective, is called the opportunity-oriented tradition and has
its roots in economic theory. This tradition focuses on the structural conditions that provide opportunities
for a group to engage in conflict with another group (Collier, 2000). The second tradition is called the
motive-oriented tradition, or ‗‗grievance‘‘ perspective, and has its origins in relative deprivation theory.
Theorists implementing the grievance perspective during the analysis of a conflict event tend to view the
eruption of political violence as a rational means to redress economic or political grievances (Gurr 1970;
Sambanis, 2002). Collier further argues that higher levels of education among men act to reduce the risk
of political violence and in a related analysis of 15 industrialized countries over a period of more than 20
years, Korenman & Neumark (1997) find that large youth cohorts are associated with a significant
increase in youth unemployment rates. So not only do youth bulges provide an unusually high supply of
individuals with low opportunity cost but an individual belonging to a relatively large youth cohort generally
also has a lower opportunity cost relative to a young person born into a smaller cohort (Urdal, 2006). The
study reveals that large youth bulges increase the risk of armed conflict.
Group Grievances
Xenophobic violence is viewed as a deeply institutionalized legacy of South Africa‘s apartheid past
and has to be specifically contextualized against a broader pattern of attacks conducted against African
non-nationals since the beginning of 1994. African non-nationals are most likely to suffer public violence
by South Africans who blame them for crime and unemployment and see them as unfair competitors in
the struggle for jobs, houses and other resources deemed ‗deserving‘ for the South Africans whose
citizenship makes them legitimate heirs to the spoils of democracy (Nyar, 2010). Foreigners who have
come to South Africa to work, study, or for other purposes have experienced a dramatic upswing of
harassment and intolerance in their daily lives (Murray, 2003).
Grievances tend to arise if possibilities to influence the political system and attain elite positions are
limited (Urdal, 2004). The existence of objective deprivation, the mere fact that people are poor, seldom
produces strong grievances. Rather, violent conflicts may erupt from cases of ‗relative deprivation‘ (Gurr,
1970). Individuals and groups can experience relative deprivation when they perceive a gap between the
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situation they believe they deserve and the situation that they have actually achieved. This is certainly
the case in many areas of South Africa. Within South Africa, there are several strong positions held
among South African nationals concerning the country‘s immigration policies. The most common
grievances voiced by South African nationals towards African non-nationals can be divided into five major
categories.
I.

Competition for Jobs
There are those who believe in opening South Africa‘s doors to skilled migrants and investors who

can make substantial contributions to the country‘s development. But there are also those who oppose
immigration as they believe immigrants take jobs away from South Africa nationals and that they
aggravate the high levels of unemployment (Marion, 1998). These opponents argue that immigration is
an obstacle to economic integration for the African majority who anticipated gains in employment and
living standards after the demise of apartheid. These beliefs are so strongly held by some South Africans
that violence has often been unleashed on unsuspecting groups of foreign-born workers, particularly
street vendors in cities like Johannesburg (Zuberi, 2004). Interestingly enough, disgruntled South
Africans have, however, focused their wrath almost exclusively on fellow Africans, virtually ignoring the
influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe and Asia (Murray, 2003). In their study on rentier state theory,
Basedau & Lay discover that grievance transmission channel suggests that perceived deprivation of
social groups or indirect negative economic consequences of resource wealth create ―grievances‖ and
trigger violent uprising (Basedau, 2009). The concept of the rentier state was developed with regard to
Middle Eastern oil-producing states such as Iran and the Gulf Monarchies and argues that the function of
the state in rentier economies is to distribute rent (Beblawi, 1987; Smith, 2004). This adverse economic
environment has heightened the tensions between local workers and foreign migrant workers.
II.

Competition for Women
Marion describes through the use of polls, surveys and focus groups how many non-national males

are viewed by South African national males as competitors for women. Past research also reveals that
there is a perception that South African men are assumed to mistreat local women and foreigners alike
(Marion, 1998).
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III.

Spread of Disease
Within South Africa, the politics of disease, and HIV/AIDS in particular, can hardly be separated from

the general xenophobia associated with the competition for jobs (Chirwa, 1998).
IV.

Spread of Crime
The popular stereotype of foreigners constructed by many South African nationals is that foreign

immigrants are linked to criminal activities. For those who harbor anti-immigrant sentiments, unwanted
foreigners epitomize the shape-shifting modalities of a racialized ―otherness‖. This sentiment is reiterated
at all scales, arguably beginning with the government. Such sentiment can lead to generalizations and
stereotyping as evidenced by the unsubstantiated claim made by former Senior Police Superintendent
Johan Steyn that, ―90 percent of criminals who break into homes, commit armed robbery and rape the
women are Zimbabweans‖ (Murray, 2003). By casually associating Zimbabweans with bank robberies
and house break-ins, Mozambicans with gun running, and Nigerians with drug trafficking, South Africans
stamp immigrant communities with an essence of criminality (Danso & McDonald, 2001). Claims,
whether substantiated or not, that link immigrants with criminality contribute to a climate of hostility and
distrust and also fortify the distinction between ―us‖ and ―them‖ (Murray, 2003). Media such as TV and
film, as they mix music, background sounds, words and visual images together, are particularly adept at
invoking such dispositions, and also at working upon them (O Tuathail, 2003). In many ways, the media
exacerbates these feelings held by many South Africans through xenophobic language.
V.

Poor Service Delivery
In 1994, around 12 million people in South Africa lacked access to clean drinking water, and 21

million lacked adequate sanitation. Only 36% of the population had access to electricity. Estimations of
unemployment rates have ranged from 25% to 40%. But they were as high as 70-80% in some urban
communities (Peberdy, 2010). Access to housing and service delivery remain extremely problematic
leaving many black South Africans, and to a lesser extent, Coloured South Africans, incredibly
marginalized (Peberdy, 2010).
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Xenophobia in the New South Africa
Racism is the name for that dimension by which persons assigned to another group are kept at a
distance because they are considered racially inferior. Xenophobia can designate the way that others are
kept at a distance because they are considered different (Banton, 1996). Universalism says that
―universalist conception achieves explicit formulation‖ and its origins can be traced back to the early
Roman Empire when, in AD 212, Roman citizenship was extended to all free men (Banton, 1996).
Another example of early universalist national identity can be found in the sixteenth century when the
Catholic Church recognized that the indigenous people of the Americas had souls. Further examples can
be found within the French Revolution with the adoption of the Declaration des Droits de l’homme et du
Citoyen (Declaration of the Human and Civil Rights), as well as within communist doctrine (Banton, 1996).
The modern geopolitical imagination came into being with the establishment of the modern territorial state
th
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system in 16 – 17 century Europe. One of its most distinguishing features of modern geopolitical
imagination is what Agnew terms ―a state-centric account of spatiality‖ characterized by three
geographical assumptions: 1) that states have exclusive sovereign power over their territories, 2) that
―domestic‖ and ―foreign‖ are separate and distinct realms and 3) that the boundaries of a state define the
boundaries of ―society‖ (Agnew, 1998). Universalism and a modern geopolitical imagination are relevant
to conflict studies within South Africa because they serve as the backdrop to explain contemporary group
identity formation theory within the country. Together they help highlight five separate theories of othering
as seen across the geographic landscape of South Africa today.
The first theory, known as Biocultural Theory, locates xenophobia at the level of visible differences, or
―otherness‖, i.e. in terms of physical biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African
foreigners in the country; essentially othering through physical differences. Biocultural Theory places an
uneven loathing of African foreign nationals squarely on their alleged visible ―otherness‖.
The second theory is known as State-Cited Theory and situates xenophobia within the
apartheid/post-apartheid transitional period, wherein broad social institutions such as the media produce
negative representations of Africa and African foreigners, representations that are congruent with the
state‘s criminalization of African foreign nationals as ―illegals‖, ―illegal aliens‖, ―illegal immigrants‖,
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criminals‖, and ―drug traffickers‖, most notably by the Department of Home Affairs (DHS) and the South
African Police Service (SAPS) (Harris, 2002).
The third theory is known as Scapegoat Theory and blames African nationals for social ills such as
crime, disease and unemployment rates. This theory is the direct manifestation of frustration by the poor
and unemployed citizens of South Africa.
The fourth theory is known as Isolation Theory and contends that the hostility towards foreign
nationals issues from the prolonged seclusion of South Africans, particularly blacks, which precluded
contact not simply with the world beyond Africa but with Africa itself. The demise of the apartheid regime
put a direct end to that isolation (Morris, 1998). Many researchers believe that South Africa‘s historic
isolation from the continent is a major incubator for the widespread distrust and suspicion aimed at
foreigners (Murray, 2003).
The fifth and final theory is known as Relative Deprivation Theory and contends that the
dissatisfaction and frustration with the inadequacy and slowness redressing the inequalities of apartheid
are leading the deprived masses to turn against foreigners. It is believed that this theory is the ideal
situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish (Tshitereke, 1999).
The apartheid regime used ―othering‖ in such a way that strengthened a broad and homogenous
class of ―non-whites‖ into one group. As apartheid fell, so did this classification, thereby diluting the nonwhite proportion of the country into smaller, weaker groups of identity, causing these smaller groups to be
more prone to conflict with one another (Marion, 1998). In the 1990s, as authoritarian regimes collapsed
world-wide, O‘Donnell & Schmitter identified three steps in a transitional process: 1) liberalization, 2)
democratization, and 3) socialization. In the first step, liberalization, a range of rights and liberties are
extended to the populace previously denied them, as occurred in South Africa. In the second step,
democratization, citizenship, participation and representation for all in the political process is extended,
again as has occurred in South Africa. However, within the third step, socialization, social and economic
equality are the goal. It is here where South Africa has failed. The key weakness of the author‘s
assumption was to assume an automatic sequence from one step to another, which has not occurred
here or in many other nations (O‘Donnell, 1998).
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A generalized term used by those researching the tensions and ensuing conflict in a post-apartheid
South Africa is ―Africa‘s fear of itself‖, a term that is exemplified by the loathing of black foreign nationals
in South Africa, particularly by the nation‘s ex-victims of apartheid. This term is increasingly becoming a
fundamental component of South Africa‘s collective identification and public culture. Since the collapse of
apartheid, the phantom of ―Makwerekwere‖ (slang for foreigner, illegal, outsider) has been constructed
and deployed in and through public discourse to render Africans from outside the borders orderable as
the nation‘s bogeymen (Matsinhe, 2011; Petkou. 2005). Historically, South Africa has set itself apart from
the rest of Africa as a ―European Outpost‖, so naturally after the fall of apartheid, the ―European Outpost‖
quickly became ―Africanized‖ (Adebayo, 1996).
Several theses have been put forward to explain what is construed as xenophobia in South Africa.
During the apartheid era, the imposition of the will of the oppressive white minority over that of a weaker
non-white majority caused self-contempt and self-loathing among the weaker group. Research shows
that over time, this constructed identity will often manifest itself in destructive behaviour including
contempt and destruction of those who resemble them the most (Matsinhe, 2011). This explains in part
why the victims of xenophobic discrimination are almost always black non-nationals and not white
tourists, and that the perpetrators of the xenophobic discrimination are almost always black South African
nationals. All across the country, white non-nationals are generally viewed by the masses as wealth
creators and therefore respected, whereas black non-nationals are viewed negatively (Shindondola,
2002).
A joint statement by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and the South African Human
Rights Commission (SAHRC) indicates that the victimization of black South Africans is being replaced by
the victimization of African foreigners, noting that not only are more and more citizens becoming more
xenophobic but they also perceive ―almost exclusively black foreigners‖ as directly responsible for rising
unemployment and violent crime (Crush, 2001). During the years of apartheid, the colonized began to
idealize their identity in the image of the colonizer, out of which was born the idea of South African
Exceptionalism. The idea required that South Africans have or are meant to have lighter skin
complexions than Africans from the greater continent (Matsinhe, 2011). The ideology of South African
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Exceptionalism is fundamental in the study of the geography of othering in a post-apartheid South Africa.
It is important to note that the condition of possibility for the belief of exceptionalism is a mythologisation
of selective reading of history that represses internal negativities (i.e. apartheid and its legacy, growing
HIV/AIDS pandemic, persistent ignorance/illiteracy, growing poverty/unemployment/inequality,
multiplication of shanty towns, increasing violent crime, and astonishing rates of rape (Matsinhe, 2011).
The other product of post-apartheid identity formation is the aversion towards those similar but
different and is manifested by the projection of the self, accrued through generations of vilification of the
other (Matsinhe, 2011). During the apartheid-era, the geography of South Africa was divided along lines
of skin colour. Black South Africans were viewed as just that, disregarding historic, ethnic, and tribal
differences. The defeat of the apartheid regime at the hands of the ANC solidified a form of exclusive
black South African nationalism that has only turned violent in the presence of group grievances.
Research validates the correlation between South African nationalism and prevalence of xenophobia
in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2008). The new South Africa has inherited a new form of identity formation
that contains the following four traits: 1) South African Exceptionalism, 2) Imagined Citizenship, 3) SelfContempt, and 4) Narcissism of Minor Differences (Matsinhe, 2011). Relations between South Africans
and African foreign nationals are a striking case of narcissism of minor differences. Immigrants are
sources of fear and anxiety the more they are imagined as invisible intruders. Immigrants from the
southern African region in particular assimilate easily in South African given the cultural and economic
hegemony of the country in the region (Matsinhe, 2011). It is the combination of these four traits that has
produced deeply rooted, and complex xenophobic sentiments within the hearts and minds of many black
South African nationals. The SAHRC has reported that illegal immigrants are often identified through
profiling of skin colour, language, hairstyle and manner of dress (Matsinhe, 2011).
Today urban apartheid geographies have remained largely intact, linked with the rapid increase in
housing prices in the post-apartheid period and a government housing delivery programme unable to
meet the demand for adequate housing (Jara, 2010). This has resulted in mass movements of people
into shack areas around larger, urban centres. Tensions are generated as people compete for land,
employment and business opportunities in spaces with tenuous material, political and social infrastructure
28

(Jara, 2010). Although not as negative or as widespread as one would be led to believe by reports in the
popular press, anti-immigrant sentiment is, nevertheless, a real concern. Physical attacks on foreign
street vendors in Johannesburg by South African traders, xenophobic press coverage, and prejudiced
comments by senior politicians about the ―flood of illegal aliens‖ in the country are indicative of the kind of
rhetoric that permeates the public debate on foreigners of African origin living in South Africa (McDonald,
2000).
The Violence of May
Between 11 and 25 May 2008, 62 people, 20 of whom were South African nationals, died in
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and to a lesser extent, parts of the Free State and Eastern Cape.
The wave of violence left 700 injured and it is estimated that at least 35, 000 African non-nationals were
driven from their homes and displaced. An un-estimated number of shacks and small businesses were
burned down, and the belongings and properties of foreign nationals worth millions of rands were looted
and dispossessed. The reaction of the South African government was slow. The eventual declaration of
a national state of emergency and the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
was too late to prevent the full brunt of violence being perpetrated (Nyar, 2010; Danso, 2001). It drew
disturbing parallels with the way in which difference was invoked by the apartheid government to justify
violence, oppression and injustice. The revival of the apartheid-derived term ‗black-on-black violence‘
invoked painful historical memories of the systematic devaluation and destruction of black lives under
apartheid. It was also a keen reminder that apartheid legacy-institutionalization of violence as a means of
communicating grievances and achieving political leverage is still very much embedded within the
national psyche (Nyar, 2010).
Authorities in the field agree that it is xenophobia, and not any other form of semantics that is largely
responsible for the violence (Everatt, 2011). It is equally clear that the violence will recur. Since May
2008, xenophobic tensions have continued in its earlier form of sporadic, poorly reported acts of violence,
though no less murderous. Whether or not the violence of May was xenophobic, a point repeatedly
rejected by then president Thabo Mbeki and most of his fellow ANC leaders, who insisted it was merely
naked criminal activity, seems rather trite in the face of the murder, rape, injury, theft and displacement
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that resulted (Everatt, 2010). While the violence was mainly directed at foreign-born African migrants,
victims also included ―shangaans‖ (term used to describe South Africans from Limpopo in particular, who
failed linguistic tests such as knowing the isiZulu word for elbow; indololwane) (Everatt, 2010; Vromans,
2011).
Extensive research has been carried out on determining the immediate triggers behind the
xenophobic violence of May 2008. Researchers agree that to a significant degree, spiraling interest
rates, frequent electricity blackouts, soaring oil/food prices, high unemployment, poor delivery of social
services, and high crime rates all played at least some role in exacerbating the violence (Everatt, 2010).
The structural characteristics of the violent outbreaks were the same: the aggressors were black insiders
and they blamed their victims for crime, unemployment, the spread of HIV/AIDS and patronization of local
women. The significant difference between May 2008 and attacks previous and since is a matter of
magnitude (Matsinhe, 2011). South Africans savagely attacked foreigners, stole their goods, raped
women, and behaved in every degrading way that they accused foreigners of doing (Everatt, 2010). It is
a common cause that despite remarkable achievements in some areas, despite social grants and free
basic services, despite development programmes in virtually every sector, despite Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) and its follow up Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE),
government has significantly failed to address inequality in South Africa (Everatt, 2010).
In May 2008 South Africa‘s three largest cities of Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town were rocked
by an explosion of xenophobic violence directed towards African non-nationals living in informal
settlements, townships, suburbs, and central business districts (Peberdy, 2010). Other cities and small
towns in South African also saw attacks on foreigners. Origins of the xenophobic violence can be traced
back to the township of Alexandra, Johannesburg in late 1994 and early 1995 (Abrahams, 2010).
Sporadic attacks, murders and displacement continued across the country until the violence of May 2008
(Peberdy, 2010). The random, unpredictable, unprovoked nature of everyday urban violence directed at
foreign immigrants makes the xenophobic attacks all the more frightening (Murray, 2003). The first
substantial work to dissect the May 2008 violence was a volume published by the University of the
Witwatersrand, following a colloquium on ―Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa ―, in late May 2008
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(Everatt, 2011). Results from these studies indicate that contributing factors to the xenophobic outburst
include structural, social, economic and spatial inequalities as well as a general reliance on cheap labour,
housing shortages, township retail competition, racism, a general history of violence to advance sectional
interests and a scarred national psyche (Everatt, 2011). There existed a seriously scarred national
psyche in early 2008 due to, as mentioned before, poor service delivery, high interest rates, high costs of
living, competition over Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing, corrupt government
officials, and high unemployment rates (Everatt, 2011; Parsley, 2010).
Researchers agree that it is not a matter of if violence on the scale of 2008 will reoccur, but when it
will reoccur (Everatt, 2011). Due to an active and vibrant civil society sector, South Africa has a basis of
research, awareness and warnings on which it could have drawn to prepare for the outbreak of violence
(Nyar, 2010). Research organizations such as the Center for Policy Studies (CPS) and Institute for a
Democratic South Africa (IDASA) had repeatedly warned of increasing xenophobic attitudes and the
potential for attitudes to harden into violence. The 2006 Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)
Xenophobia Survey confirmed that in comparison to citizens of other countries worldwide, South Africans
are the least open to outsiders and advocate the greatest restrictions on immigration. 67% of SAMP
respondents indicated that African non- nationals use up resources, 49% believed that foreign nationals
bring disease, and that they are responsible for high crime levels. 84% felt that South Africa is allowing
―too many‖ African non-nationals into the country and consequently that they should not be accorded any
rights or protection from the state (Nyar, 2010).
The dynamics of the May 2008 attacks were such that it was able to spread rapidly across various
geographical areas and provincial borders. It quickly migrated from Gauteng to other provinces such as
Kwa-Zulu Natal, Eastern Cape and the Western Cape, and to a lesser extent, the Free State, North West
and Limpopo Province. The xenophobic attacks of 2008 denoted a marked difference in scale, for which
the increasing momentum of earlier incidences of violence could well be seen as a forewarning.
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III. STUDY SITE
South Africa is administratively divided into nine provinces (Figure 9.), and further divided into 53
districts (47 district municipalities and 6 metropolitan districts). These districts are then divided into 248
local municipalities. The nine provinces vary in a number of ways. The Western Cape has the highest
human development index (HDI) followed by Gauteng, while the ten most deprived districts in 2007/2008
were located in KwaZulu-Natal (6), Eastern Cape (3) and Limpopo (1) that are all classified as rural
development districts. Conversely, all districts within the Western Cape were classified as the least
deprived as were three of the six metros, namely the City of Cape Town and Nelson Mandela metro
(Eastern Cape) and the City of Johannesburg (Gauteng) (Sartorius, 2011).

Figure 9. The Nine Provinces of the Republic of South Africa.
The location of the xenophobic attacks of May 2008 (Figure 10.) tended to be located in poor urban
neighborhoods and informal settlements in different parts of South Africa where foreign nationals and
South African citizens lived in mixed communities and in close proximity to each other (Nyar, 2010). After
1994, urban spaces became re-defined by dual processes of rapid and sustained migratory streams of
foreign nationals entering South Africa. Such migratory streams included sustained numbers fleeing
32

political turmoil in neighboring Zimbabwe. Rural-based black South Africans also constituted part of the
influx to cities in search of jobs and improved economic opportunities and prospects. The presence of
large numbers of African non-nationals living in close proximity to poor South Africans in squalid and
congested urban living spaces has had the effect of breeding extreme social discontent (Nyar, 2010).

Figure 10. Locations of Xenophobic Violence, January – July 2008 (Everatt, 2010)
Johannesburg
South Africa is in the top three most unequal countries on earth, and Johannesburg among the most
unequal cities on earth, joined by Pretoria (Everatt, 2010). On the whole, cities remain spatially divided
and black poor and working class still living in geographically marginalized and peripheral areas of the
city which are under-serviced and marked by high levels of unemployment, poverty, economic
marginalization and social crises (Peberdy, 2010). In many South African cities, migrants face many
difficulties ranging from discrimination and prejudice to outright violence and intimidation, but the
epicenter of anti-immigrant xenophobia is the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region. Like similar
cities, Johannesburg has become a magnet for ―bi-polar migration‖, drawing into its orbit large groups of
individuals in the survivalist enterprise (Murray, 2003). The hostility and violence directed at foreign
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immigrants is an integral feature of everyday life in the Johannesburg metropolitan region. It is difficult to
investigate the poor treatment of immigrants however, because the available evidence consists largely of
anecdotal, sketchy stories sensationalized in newspaper accounts or passed on in urban legend (Murray,
2003).
21 key urban areas of the country contribute 70% of the national economy. Johannesburg is the only
city in South Africa to be classified as a world city. Whereas Cape Town and Durban are port cities key to
South African trade, Johannesburg serves as an economic and trade hub for the country and region
(Peberdy, 2010). In 2001, some 56% of South Africa‘s population was found to live in cities.
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban along with Ekurhuleni and Tshwane (Pretoria) are the country‘s
core urban regions (Peberdy, 2010). There has been a significant increase in the rate of urbanization
since the early 90‘s as racial restrictions on movement and residence were lifted. Today, internal
migration is a key feature of the population growth of cities such as Johannesburg (Peberdy, 2010).
Despite being sites of wealth creation, South Africa‘s cities are also sites of great inequality and poverty,
the official unemployment rate for all cities averaging over 25% in 2001 (Peberdy, 2010).
The inception of the xenophobic attacks in Alexandra is critical in terms of explicating an
understanding of the anomalous nature of the violence. Alexandra is a well-established township with a
history of sheltering migrants and immigrants. It is also historically well known as a stronghold of civic
activism and radical democratic politics. However, Alexandra was unable to contain high levels of
frustration and discontent over living conditions from boiling over into unrestrained violence against
foreign nationals living in the township alongside South African citizens (Nyar, 2010). The violence was
characterized by weapons used such as pangas (a type of axe), machetes, petrol bombs, bricks and
stones, as well as the violence committed such as murder, beatings, burnings, rape, theft and looting
(Nyar, 2010).
Cape Town
In Cape Town in 2006 an estimated 22% of all households lived in informal dwellings, including
almost 60% of the city‘s black households (37% in informal settlements and 22% in backyards) and 7% of
Coloured households (2% in informal settlements). Some 18% of Cape Town‘s households lived in
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overcrowded conditions (29% of black and 21% of Coloured). South African cities are also facing social
crises. Health care is a particular problem for cities. HIV prevalence rates in South Africa are amongst
the highest in the world, in part because the high rate of circular migration within the country creates
conditions which encourage the spread of the virus. HIV prevalence rates from antenatal clinics in 2006
were 17% in Cape Town, 32% in Johannesburg, and 42% in Durban (Peberdy, 2010). Communities
situated within urban areas of the country, particularly those on the periphery, also face challenges of
crime and violence, some of which is related to drug use (Peberdy, 2010).
Following the lifting of the ―Coloured Preference Area‖ between 1985 and 2005 the black population
of the city of Cape Town increased from less than 200,000 to over one million (Peberdy, 2010). Under
apartheid, the legal status of black South Africans, particularly in the Western Cape, was little different
from that of African people who entered the country illegally from beyond South Africa‘s borders. They
were effectively foreigners in their own land (Dodson, 2000). The rapid influx of both African nonnationals as well as Black South African nationals into the Cape over the past two decades has caused
extremes on both sides of the socioeconomic divide to be brought together. This has in many ways lead
to tensions between groups living in the area. One of several places to have experienced such conflict is
Mizamoyethu, an informal settlement located in Hout Bay, Cape Town.
Practically since its inception in 1991, Mizamoyethu has seen tension between South African
nationals and foreign-national residents (Dodson, 2000). Residents of Mizamoyethu compete not in
some abstract economic sense, but directly for the very same jobs, undercutting each other in wage
bargaining for work on the same fishing boats and beating the same streets seeking employment in the
houses and gardens of their wealthy white neighbors (Dodson, 2000). Lacking either skills or capital, and
with only limited social support networks, their position in the urban system is both highly precarious and
jealously guarded (Dodson, 2000). Feelings of resentment and envy towards even these limited levels of
economic well-being are hardly surprising in themselves, and are exacerbated by the perception that
foreigners have ―stolen‖ something from South Africans. Such material differences, and the structural
forces which underpin them, are the primary source of tension in the community (Dodson, 2000).
Certainly, some of the foreign respondents could afford to live in more formal settlements, but widespread
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hostility towards foreigners and the lack of clarity about their residence status in South Africa may
preclude, or at least discourage, them from entering the formal property market elsewhere in Cape Town.
For those without official residence status in the country, places like Mizamoyethu are also relatively easy
places in which to be invisible form the authorities (Dodson, 2000).
Durban
Durban is intimately linked to the history of Zulu identity and class formation, to the making of
segregation and to regional popular protest (Freund, 2001). African men came to labour in Durban,
particularly in the transport sector and in the homes of settlers. In addition, a large population of Indians
lived in Durban. Although indentured workers were brought to Natal from 1860 to work in the sugar fields,
a significant and growing percentage were involved in other economic activities, for instance the Natal
Railways. A large barracks housed hundreds of Indian families on the edge of the city centre to serve the
railways while many gathered around Durban where they reconstituted Indian family life and were able to
combine employment (increasingly, from the 1920s, industrial employment) with fishing, farming,
commercial and artisanal activity (Freund, 2001). The reasons for the Indian presence on the edge of
Durban were twofold: it was an attraction for many to live on land where non-wage sources of income
could be practiced, and the living was cheap and relatively uncontrolled by the state, by the 1920s, it had
become very difficult for Indians to buy houses or land in areas of town that whites had staked out for
themselves (Freund, 2001). As Swanson pointed out, moreover, the problems for Indian merchants were
even greater due to the biased local and state‘s command of licensing rights (Freund, 2001).
Moreover, segregation, while increasingly enshrined in national legislation, was not an entirely
practicable policy financially. Voluntary immigration supplied the fuel for industrialization in Durban;
therefore, it would not be financially viable to completely segregate (Freund, 2001). The state operated
on the theory that races were naturally antagonistic to each other and needed to be separated in the
interests of peace, with neutral zones between them (Freund, 2001). In fact, white commercial and
residential flight was a notable feature. The city has, in part for this reason, become increasingly
―decentered‖ (Freund, 2001).
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The rapid rate of urbanization in South African cities like Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban
since the early 90s indicates that the challenge to provide services to its population grows as the state
tries to keep up with new arrivals. However, poverty, inequality, lack of services and lack of adequate
housing are not reasons to attack people for who they are and for the citizenship they hold (Peberdy,
2010). Figure 11. represents the total access to services across the three large urban centres of Cape
Town, Durban, and Johannesburg respectively.
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Figure 11. Access to services in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg, 2001 (Peberdy, 2010).
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Given the lack of vital registration data and the inability of migration surveys to yield reliable estimates
of the total number of migrants, censuses remain an adequate source of data for painting a picture of
internal and international population movements in and across African societies (Zuberi, 2004). This
statement holds especially true in the context of monitoring the relationships between South African
nationals and non-nationals. This approach has been duplicated across many fields by many
researchers involved in area studies research (Weeks, 2004). The task of planning and implementing
censuses in South Africa is the responsibility of Statistics South Africa (STATSSA).
Geospatial analysis is an important tool used in human geographic research to detect possible
sources of heterogeneity, spatial incidence or patterns (Sartorius, 2011). The potential of spatial analysis
is reinforced by the increasing availability of geographically indexed population level data, as well as
advances in computation methods using GIS systems. Spatial analysis, moreover, can be applied to
census data in small area studies, as well as to imperfect data, often the case in Africa, through the use
of space and time geo-statistics (Sartorius, 2011).
Community Survey 2007
All demographic data used during this research was provided by the 2007 Community Survey.
STATSSA is mandated by law, in terms of Stats Act No. 6 of 1999, to collect reliable statistical information
from the public, which informs development and democracy in the country. STATSSA conducts the
Population Census, and several other household-based surveys such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
and the General Household Survey (GHS) on an ongoing basis. Until recently, South Africa collected
census information from the public every five years. As such, the previous two censuses undertaken in
1996 and 2001 generated diverse geographic and socio-economic information that provided insight into
the performance of government programs. This provision of information collected through these two
censuses has also inspired high expectations from data users regarding the availability of statistics at a
high geographic resolution. In 2001, parliament decided to have the census take a ten-year cycle with a
large-scale household survey being undertaken in 2007. Community Survey 2007 (CS 2007) is the name
of the mini census and is the first of its kind in the country. The purpose of the survey is to collect
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information on the trends and level of demographic and socio-economic data; the extent of poor
households; access to facilities and services; levels of employment and unemployment; in order to assist
government and private sector in planning, evaluating and monitoring programs and policies. CS 2007 is
not only a measure of development trajectory that South Africa has undertaken since 1994, it is also
intended to elevate difficult questions around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United
Nations for which South Africa has committed itself to achieving since the 1990s. In CS 2007, 949, 105
persons were enumerated and 246, 618 households were covered during the enumeration, with a
response rate of 93.9%. The survey randomly sampled enumeration areas (EA) and then dwelling units
within each EA. An EA is the smallest geographical unit (piece of land) into which the country is divided
for enumeration purposes. Enumeration areas contain between 100 to 250 households. The survey was
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conducted between February 7 and February 28 , 2007 (Community Survey 2007 Basic Results). CS
2007 results were released on 24 October 2007. After the evaluation of the data by the Stats Council, CS
2007 was found to be comparable in many aspects with other STATSSA surveys, censuses and other
external sources.
The South African Statistics Council found the reported demographic data to be entirely plausible
when compared to other censuses. Certain limitations and potential errors were identified by STATSSA
and the South African Statistics Council when reviewing the survey, however the following systematic
errors were observed in the data: underestimate of men relative to women, underestimate of children
younger than 10 years, excess of people aged 10-24 in Western Cape and Gauteng, and deficit of
women aged 20-34 in Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo.
Scale and Geographic Hierarchy of Data
The spatial version of local municipality, district municipality and provincial boundaries used in CS
2007, is the December 2005 version as released by the Municipal Demarcation Board in January 2006.
All municipal name and code changes as implemented since the December 2005 release were
incorporated. In total, there are six (6) metropolitan municipalities, forty-six (46) district municipalities, two
hundred and thirty one (231) local municipalities, and twenty (20) district management areas. Figure 12
explains the hierarchical structure used for geographic areas in CS 2007.
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Figure 12. Geographical hierarchy for Community Survey 2007.
Two spatial scales were used for analysis operations for this research. Analysis of geospatial and
socioeconomic trends at the provincial level utilized data at Level 2 (province). All grievances and
opportunities were mapped at a scale of Level 2. EA units at this scale included all nine (9) provinces of
South Africa. Further analysis was carried out at a scale of Level 3 (metropolitan + district municipalities)
when datasets representing grievances and opportunities at this scale were available from CS 2007. EA
units at Level 3 included the six (6) metropolitan municipalities as well as the forty-six (46) district
municipalities for a combined total of 52 Level 3 EA units. Spatial analysis for datasets at a scale of Level
2 resulted in a series of quantitative thematic maps. No further statistical analysis was carried out at this
scale. However, datasets that were available from CS 2007 at a scale of Level 3 allowed for further
statistical analysis. This is due to the fact that there are only 9 EA units at a scale of Level 2. Statistical
analysis at this scale would not produce statistically significant relationships amongst features. There are
52 EA units at a scale of Level 3, thus producing a stronger series of statistically significant relationships
amongst features.
Data Source and Projection
The two main sources of data used to carry out this research were CS 2007 for all demographic and
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socioeconomic data and Map Library (www.maplibrary.org/Africa), an open source data clearinghouse
containing administrative boundaries for South Africa‘s provinces and municipalities. A national shapefile
of the study area was created by downloading the 52 Level 3 EA and 9 Level 2 EA units as individual
shapefiles directly from Map Library. The entire dataset has been reviewed and updated to reflect
administrative boundaries as per January, 2007. This is temporally consistent with data obtained from
CS 2007. The national shapefile was then imported into a file geodatabase using ArcGIS Desktop 10.0 to
create the necessary areal and geospatial data for analysis (Figure 13.).

Figure 13. Creating file geodatabase, Ubuntu.
The selected geographic coordinate system used during analysis operations was the global world
geodetic system, WGS_1984_EASE_Grid_Global. This coordinate system was used for each analysis
operation to maintain the integrity of spatial data. The projection selected was a cylindrical equal area
projection as equal area projections are best used in analysis of quantitative attributes by area.
Grievance and Opportunity Mapped
In order to geospatially represent the propensity for xenophobic violence within urban areas across
South Africa, the five major grievances South African nationals have voiced in response to immigration
were mapped, creating a serious of grievance maps. The grievances are categorized as follows: 1)
competition for jobs, 2) competition for women, 3) spread of disease, 4) spread of crime, and 5) poor
service delivery from the government. Each grievance contains unique datasets obtained from CS 2007.
1. Competition for Jobs
The competition for jobs grievance was represented by unemployment rates by province (Level 2)
and municipality (Level 3). The following datasets were selected from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) as
inputs to a file geodatabase to best represent this grievance:
a. Unemployment Status
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According to the official unemployment definition, a person must satisfy the following three conditions:
1) the person did not work during the seven days prior to the survey interview, and does not have any job
attachment, 2) the person wants to work and is available to start work within two weeks, and 3) the
person has taken active steps to look for work or to start a business in the four weeks prior to the
interview (cite). The universe included each person aged 15-65 who usually resided in the household for
at least four nights a week and had done so for the past four weeks, and any other person who stayed
over the previous night as a visitor. Respondents could answer one of the four following ways: 1)
Employed, 2) Unemployed, 3) Not economically active, and 4) Unspecified. The following equation was
used to determine the unemployment rates per EA unit:
( )

, where

= unemployment rate,

= total no. unemployed,

= labour force

Once the unemployment rates were calculated, a choropleth map was produced to spatially represent
unemployment rates per EA unit.
2. Competition for Women
The second grievance is that non-nationals take away women meant for South African nationals. The
competition for women grievance was calculated by comparing the ratio of black South African women
with the ratios of unmarried individuals and immigrants. Representing this grievance was accomplished
by obtaining census data from the Family Survey (FS). This database contains data on marital status and
relationship to the head of household. Data was obtained at both scales; Level 2 and Level 3. The
following datasets were used:
a. Gender and Population Group
The four population groups in South Africa are: 1) Black, 2) Coloured, 3) Indian or Asian, and 4)
White. Because the majority of grievances made towards African non-nationals are by black South
African nationals, the percentages of black women were calculated per total number of women living in an
EA unit at Level 2 and Level 3 scales, thus normalizing the data. The output would be a spatial
representation of the distribution of black women across the country, represented through a series of
choropleth maps.
b. Married Status
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This question was asked to determine the marital status of the members of a household. Table 1
represents the possible choices a respondent could list for marital status.
Civil/

Living
Traditional

Polygamous

religious

Never

Widower or

Separated

Divorced

married (e)

widow (f)

(g)

(h)

together
(b)

(c)

(a)

(d)

Table 1. Marital Status
A category of ―not married‖ (NM) was created from the following equation:

The rate of NM (R) was calculated as follows:
(

)

A series of choropleth maps were then created to represent the spatial distribution of individuals ―not
married‖ across the country. As those who are not married are more likely to seek partnership with other
single ―not married‖ individuals, this analysis was significant in measuring this grievance.
c.

Province of Previous Residence

This question was asked to determine from which province each person had moved since 2001. If
the move was from another country, ―Outside RSA was recorded‖ (Community Survey, 2007). The
following table (Table 2) represents the choices respondents could give:
Western

Eastern

Northern

Free

KwaZulu-

North

Outside
Gauteng

Cape

Cape

Cape

State

Natal

Mpumalanga

West

Limpopo
RSA

Table 2. Province of Previous Residence
As reliable data on immigration is incredibly difficult to obtain (or non-existent), the above data were used
to create a sense of movement of people within the country. Of particular interest was the number of
persons who had migrated from outside South Africa (Outside RSA) since 2001. Data was disregarded
for every respondent that had not moved from a previous province since 2001. A series of choropleth
maps was created as outputs to represent the numbers of ―immigrants‖ per each EA unit at Level 2 and
Level 3 scales.
3. Spread of Disease
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With the geographic patterns of the spread of HIV/AIDS, it has become very easy for most South
Africans to view the disease as a ―black peril‖ from other countries (Chirwa, 1998). It is believed by many
that African non-nationals entering the country legally or illegally bring with them various diseases,
particularly sexually-transmitted diseases. The spread of disease grievance was calculated by comparing
the reported rates of cause of death from disease for 2007 with the total number of reported deaths for
the same year. In order to map this grievance, the following dataset was obtained from CS 2007‘s Cause
of death from death notification 2007 survey:
a. Cause of Death from Disease
The cause of death from disease was broken into six categories within the survey: 1) immediate
cause of death, 2) second condition leading to death, 3) third condition leading to death, 4) fourth
condition leading to death, 5) other conditions leading to death, and 6) underlying cause of death. Each
category included the individual diseases that caused death. The total numbers of death per each
disease were then added together across all six categories to create a list of total causes of death due to
disease per province. The following table (Table 3) lists the different types of disease responsible for
cause of death in 2007:
Tuberculosis (of respiratory, nervous system,
Syphilis (congenital, late, other)
other organs)
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)

Gonococcal infection

Granuloma inguinale

Trichomoniasis
Other predominantly STD; not elsewhere

Herpes simplex
classified
Chlamydial lymphogranuloma (venereum)

Unspecified STD

Other sexually transmitted chlamydial diseases
Table 3. Cause of Death from Disease Type
This dataset was only available at a scale of Level 2. Cause of death from disease rates were calculated
by dividing the total number of cause of death from disease by the total number of cause of death per
each EA unit (province). The output would be a spatial distribution of the reported cause of death rates
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from disease per EA unit (province).
4. Spread of Crime
There is a commonly held belief that African non-nationals exacerbate crime rates as they travel
through areas of the country. The spread of crime grievance was calculated using reported death rates
from assault and reported rates of individuals being sexually assaulted, beaten up, harassed, or
burglarized by someone outside of the household in 2007. All datasets used to map this grievance were
obtained from a scale of Level 2 (province). In order to map this grievance, the following datasets were
obtained from CS 2007:
a. Cause of Death from Assault
Data was obtained from CS 2007‘s ―Mortality and causes of death from death notification 2007‖
survey. Death from assault numbers included any of the following listed cause of death from assault
categories (Table 4):
Handgun discharge

Larger firearm

Firearm discharge

Hit/struck by another

discharge

(other)

person

Assault (hanging,
Striking

drowning, handgun,

Poisoning (drugs,

against/bumped into by

explosive material,

alcohol, gases,

another person

chemicals, sharp/blunt

pesticides, herbal)

Witch doctor enema

object, other)
Table 4. Cause of Death by Assault Category
The data was collected and then normalized against the total reported number of cause of death per
province in order to produce cause of death by assault rates across the study area. Three additional
crime-related categories were created from which data was available from CS 2007. Each of these
categories, as well as cause of death from assault, were spatially represented in order to effectively map
the alleged grievance that African non-nationals are responsible for a general feeling of vulnerability felt
by many South African nationals.
b. Been beaten up by someone outside the household
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Data was obtained from the GHS. Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO
or Unspecified. To spatially represent the rates of persons that had been beaten up by someone outside
the household ( ) in 2007, the following equation was used:
(
c.

)

Been harassed by someone outside the household

Data was obtained from the GHS. Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO
or Unspecified. To spatially represent the rates of persons harassed by someone outside the household
( ) in 2007, the following equation was used:
(

)

d. Been sexually assaulted by someone outside the household
Data was obtained from the GHS. Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO
or Unspecified. To spatially represent the rates of persons sexually assaulted by someone outside the
household ( ) in 2007, the following equation was used:
(

)

e. Had something stolen by someone outside the household
Data was obtained from the GHS. Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO
or Unspecified. To spatially represent the rates of theft
(

in 2007, the following equation was used:
)

Each of these five datasets were represented as a series of choropleth maps.
5. Poor Service Delivery (from government)
The final grievance used in this study was one that is voiced by the majority of the country; the
ineffective service provisions made by the government for all people living in South Africa. The poor
service delivery grievance was calculated using three datasets: percentages of individuals without access
to piped water within the household, percentages of individuals without access to land, and percentages
of individuals without an electricity mains supply within the household during 2007. The datasets were
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obtained from the GHS and were only available at a scale of Level 2 (province). In order to map this
grievance the following datasets were selected from the GHS to represent this grievance.
a. Access to piped water within the household
This question was asked to determine the accessibility of a basic resource that should be provided by
the government, water; water for drinking, cleaning, and washing. To spatially represent the distribution
of persons without access to piped water

in 2007, the following equation was used:
(

)

b. Access to land
Competition over land has been a major source of contention between South African nationals and
immigrating communities of African non-nationals. Determining the spatial distribution of the accessibility
of land would prove beneficial in determining the extent of this grievance. To spatially represent the
distribution of persons without access to land

in 2007, the following equation was used:
(

c.

)

Main electricity supply at household

It has been documented that one underlying trigger to the mass violence of 2008 was frequency of
electricity blackouts, an indicator of poor service delivery (Everatt, 2010). To spatially represent the
distribution of persons without a main electricity supply
(

in 2007, the following equation was used:
)

A series of choropleth maps were created to represent this grievance.
The Grievance Maps geospatially represent motives for conflict and they are driven by how one group
perceives another. These maps attempt to show that motives for conflict in South Africa are driven by the
relative deprivation of one group, Black South African nationals.
Opportunity Maps
In addition to the presence of group grievances, there must also exist an opportunity for violence.
Grievances alone rarely lead to the type of violence that occurred in South Africa between May and July
of 2008. The Opportunity Maps answer the question of identifying what structural conditions exist that
47

provides opportunities for South African nationals to respond to the presence of non-nationals through
violent means. Because the opportunity-oriented tradition towards conflict has its roots in economic
theory, datasets were selected from CS 2007 and the GHS to represent measurable economic factors
that could influence the opportunity of conflict in South Africa.
1. Youth Bulge
Data representing the labour force was obtained from the LFS at scales of Level 2 (province) and
Level 3 (municipality). This database only covers people of working age (15-65 years of age), whether
economically active or not. Data representing youth bulges (15-24 years of age) was obtained from CS
2007. A youth bulge is determined by the total number of youth aged 15-24
population ( ). To spatially represent the distribution of youth bulges

divided by the total adult

in 2007, the following equation

was used:
( )
A series of choropleth maps were created to represent this grievance.
2. Poverty
Four socioeconomic factors were chosen from the GHS to represent this opportunity. The first three
datasets covered a scale of Level 2 (province) only. Data was not available for these datasets at a scale
of Level 3 (municipality). The last dataset, monthly income category was available at a scale of Level 2
(province) and Level 3 (municipality). The following datasets were selected to represent this opportunity:
a. Children living on the streets
Children living on streets indicate that there is a fundamental breakdown in government provisions for
its people. To spatially represent the distribution of the number of children living on streets

in 2007,

the following equation was used:
(

)

b. Have a car
Car ownership was selected to represent an indicator of relative wealth. To spatially represent the
distribution of car ownership

in 2007, the following equation was used:
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(
c.

)

Can‘t afford water

To spatially represent the distribution of individuals who cannot afford water

in 2007, the

following equation was used:
(

)

d. Monthly Income Category (MIC)
This dataset was used to determine the income category that best describes the gross monthly
income before deductions and includes all sources of income. Due to the availability of the data at scale,
MIC data was represented at both Level 2 (province) and Level 3 (municipality) scales. Table 5
represents the different classifications of this dataset:
No Income
R1 - R400
R401 – R800
R801 – R1600
R1601 – R3200
R3201 – R6400
R6401 – R12800
R12801 – R25600
R25601 – R51200
R51201 – R102400
R102401 – R204800
R204801 or more
Table 5. Monthly Income Categories
Prior research has shown that the food poverty line across South Africa was found to be R211 per capita
per month (in 2000 prices) (Woolard & Leibbrandt, 2006). Directly from this research, STATSSA derived
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a ―lower bound‖ poverty line of R322 per capita per month and an ―upper bound‖ poverty line of R593 per
capita per month (in 2000 prices). The STATSSA ―upper bound‖ was calculated by observing the total
consumption spending of households that spend R211 per capita on food. STATSSA found that
households that spent approximately R211 per capita per month on food had an average per capita
expenditure level of R593 (R211 on food and R382 on non-food items). This is the ―traditional‖ cost of
basic needs approach to determining the non-food component of the poverty line (Woolard & Leibbrandt,
2006). For the purposes of this study, the ―upper bound‖ poverty line was raised to include the categories
of ―no income‖, ―R1-R400‖, and ―R401-R800‖ due to the availability of the census data at this category. A
Modified Poverty Rate

can then be calculated by dividing the combination of respondents

representing the ―no income‖ and ―R1-R800‖ by the total number of respondents

. The following

equation represents the calculation:
(

)

A series of choropleth maps were created to spatially represent this opportunity.
Spatial Autocorrelation in GIS
Once the grievances and opportunities were mapped, spatial statistical analyses were carried out to
determine if the spatial distribution of values per grievance and opportunity (high or low) were statistically
significant across the study area and therefore worth further investigation. To identify hot spots or
clustering of data values per grievance, the ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) statistical tool (Figure
14) was used.

Figure 14. ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) Model.
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In each case, the tool tested to see if there were hot or cold spots of a grievance or opportunity
surrounded by hot or cold spots of the same grievance or opportunity. Prior to running the analysis, the
appropriate conceptualization of spatial relationships was determined. Choosing the correct
conceptualization of spatial relationships was vital in testing the interaction between features and any
shared commonality amongst neighboring features. The zone of indifference conceptualization of spatial
relationships was chosen so that features that fell outside of a critical distance would be weighted
appropriately and included in the analysis. The final necessary step taken before running the analysis
was to select an appropriate distance band. The distance needed to match the scale of the field of study
and needed to result in every feature having at least several neighbors (ArcGIS Resource Center).
Selecting a distance band that is too small would result in the features not having enough neighbors,
therefore resulting in unwanted results. To select the appropriate distance band, the Spatial
Autocorrelation (Morans I) tool (Figure 15) was used.

Figure 15. ESRI Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans I) Model.
Once run, this tool provides as an output a Z-score for the entire study area at that specific distance band
(ESRI Resources). The inputs and conceptualization of spatial relationships are the same as the Hot
Spot Analysis tool for each grievance and opportunity. The smallest distance that is at a scale consistent
with the study area was determined to be 15,000m (15km). The Z score created as an output is a
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measure of how clustered the values are (Figure 16). To determine the most appropriate distance band
to use for this study area, the tool was run 31 times at 15,000m intervals until reaching a distance band of
450,000m (450km). The value of 450,000m was selected because any distance greater would result in
the loss of subtle differences between districts. Each distance and Z-score value was added to a table,
and then imported into ArcMap. The Z-scores were then graphed (Figure 17), showing the global Z-score
values for the 31 distance bands. Due to the large spatial extent of the study area, a distance band of
250,000m (250km) was selected. This method allows the data to determine the most appropriate
distance band to use in the analysis.

Figure 16. Spatial Autocorrelation Report.
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Figure 17. Selecting an Appropriate Distance Band.
Once the distance band was selected, hot spot analyses were conducted for the following grievances at a
scale of Level 3: 1) stealing jobs, 2) stealing women, and for the following opportunities: 1) youth bulge, 2)
poverty.
Predictive Modeling using Regression Analysis
Mapping clusters of high and low data values identifies where statistically significant spatial
relationships occur across the study area. To determine how these relationships influence xenophobic
violence requires modeling the spatial relationships. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) tool was used to
answer this question (Figure 18). The OLS tool served as a predictive model to illustrate the degree of
influence that grievances and opportunities have over the xenophobic violence of 2008.
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Figure 18. ESRI Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model.
The greatest challenge in OLS modeling is finding the appropriate set of explanatory variables that help to
best support the dependent variable. Exploratory Regression Analysis, an effective method in
determining accurate explanatory variables, was used to identify which grievances and opportunities are
most likely to support the OLS model (Figure 29).

Figure 19. Exploratory Regression Model (ERM)
In order to better understand the relationships between the grievances and opportunities with the
locations of the 2008 xenophobic violence, an OLS regression equation is used to serve as a global
model of the variable that is being predicted (ESRI Resources). The following OLS regression equation
was used:
0

where

Dependent Variable,

+

1X1

+

2X2

+ …….

nX n

+ ,

= Coefficients, X = Explanatory Variables and
Term/Residuals
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= Random Error

Exploratory regression models every possible combination of variables, in an attempt to create a
regression model that best supports the assumptions of the OLS equation. Previous research indicates
that grievances and opportunities (unemployment rates, modified poverty rates, distribution of black
women, singleness, distribution of foreigners, and youth bulge) are substantial candidates for this model.
The dependent variable in this case represents the 74 event locations of xenophobic violence that
occurred across the country from May – July of 2008. The event locations are a function of the
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are represented by the grievances and opportunities.
Coefficients represent the degree to which each explanatory variable influences the dependent variable
(directly or indirectly).
The 2008 violence event locations were aggregated from their point data source into a feature class
that contained the grievance and opportunity data, resulting in both dependent and independent variables
stored together in the same dataset. After selecting the appropriate independent variables, the OLS tool
was run producing a thematic map of the study area that represented the predictive strength of the model
to relate the independent variables (grievances and opportunities) with the dependent variable (locations
of 2008 violence). In order to ensure the reliability of the OLS model, the residuals produced from
running the OLS diagnostic were checked for correlation using the ESRI Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans
I) tool. Running this tool at the end of the analysis process would reveal the degree of correlation
amongst residuals, and most importantly indicate the degree of randomness of the residuals.
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V. RESULTS & ANALYSIS
Grievance Maps
1. Competition for Jobs
The distribution of unemployment rates in 2007 was represented at two spatial scales, Level 2
(province) and Level 3 (municipality). Unemployment rates at Level 2 (province) contained five
classifications, ranging from a low of 19.15% to a high of 24.74% (Figure 20).

Figure 20. Spatial Distribution of Unemployment Rates by Province, 2007.
The analysis indicates that the nation‘s highest unemployment rates are concentrated in the central to
north central and eastern parts of the country. The North West, Free State and Gauteng experienced the
highest unemployment rates (23.95% – 24.74%). KwaZulu-Natal had an unemployment rate of 22.93% 23.94%. The Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga contained unemployment rates of 21.65% - 22.92%). The
Northern Cape and Limpopo contained unemployment rates of 19.16% - 21.64%) and the Western Cape
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had the lowest unemployment rates of 19.15%. The Western Cape contains three municipalities
representing the lowest unemployment rates (15.18% - 17.37%), two municipalities with rates of 17.38% 20.76%), and one municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%. The Northern Cape contains one
municipality representing the lowest unemployment rates (15.18% - 17.37%), two municipalities with rates
of 17.38% - 20.76%, one municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, and one municipality with rates of
22.91% - 26.16%. The Free State contains two municipalities with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, two
municipalities with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and one municipality with rates of 26.17 – 30.34%. The
North West province contains one municipality with rates of 17.38% - 20.76%, one municipality with rates
of 20.77% - 22.90%, one municipality with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and one municipality with rates of
26.17% - 30.34%.
Gauteng province contains three municipalities with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, two municipalities with
rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and one municipality with rates of 26.17% - 30.34%. Limpopo province
contains one municipality with rates of 17.38% - 20.76%, three municipalities with rates of 20.77% 22.90%, and one municipality with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%. Mpumalanga contains two municipalities
with rates of 20.77% - 22.90% and one municipality with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%. KwaZulu-Natal
contains one municipality with rates of 15.18% - 17.37%, two municipalities with rates of 17.38% 20.76%, one municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, five municipalities with rates of 22.91% 26.16%, and two municipalities with rates of 26.17% - 30.34%. The Eastern Cape contains one
municipality with rate of 15.18% - 17.37%, one municipality with rates of 17.38% - 20.76%, one
municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, two municipalities with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and two
municipalities with rates of 26.17% - 30.34% (Figure 22).
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Figure 21. Spatial Distribution of Unemployment Rates by Municipality, 2007
Results from running the Hot Spot Analysis tool on unemployment rates at a scale of Level 3
produces a feature class that is symbolized to reveal hot spots and cold spots across the dataset. A hot
spot (red) symbolizes a statistically significant cluster of high values and a cold spot (blue) symbolizes a
statistically significant cluster of low values. Figure 22 represents the hot spot analysis for unemployment
rates at a scale of Level 3, indicating that significant clustering of high unemployment rates occurs in an
easily discernible band stretching from the eastern half of the North West province heading in a
southeasterly direction, through Gauteng, western Mpumalanga, eastern Free State and finally finishing
in central KwaZulu-Natal. There is also significant clustering of high values in western Eastern Cape.
Conversely, significant clustering of low values occurs in the far west of the country, specifically in the
westernmost extents of the Northern and Western Cape.
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Figure 22. Hot Spot Analysis of Unemployment Rates, 2007.
2. Competition for Women
A series of quantitative thematic maps was produced to identify the spatial distribution of women by
population group across the country per municipality, particularly the spatial distribution of black women
(Figure 23.a). Figure 24 represents the spatial distribution of women by population group at a scale of
Level 2 (province). Figures 25 and 26 complete the grievance by representing the spatial distribution of
singleness and immigrants respectively at both spatial scales. Both figures 23 and 24 reveal that the
spatial distribution of black women are concentrated in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country.
Conversely, the concentration of coloured women are concentrated in the south and southwestern parts
of the country. The concentration of Indian/Asian women are mostly found in KwaZulu-Natal, with some
significant numbers located in the country‘s metropolitan regions of Johannesburg in Gauteng province
and Cape Town in the Western Cape (Figure 23). Finally, the concentration of white women are more
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evenly distrubuted across the country with significant concentrations associated with the large urban
areas of Cape Town (Western Cape), Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape), Johnnesburg and Pretoria
(Gauteng), Durban (KwaZulu-Natal), Bloemfontein (Free State), and Kimberley (Northern Cape).
Figure 25 indicates that the higher rates of individuals who are not traditionally married are located in
the northeastern and easternmost regions of the country. Conversely, the central and southwesternmost
regions of the country represent the lowest rates of singleness in 2007.

60

a) Black

b) Coloured
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c) Indian/Asian

d) White
Figure 23. Spatial Distribution of Women by Population Group per Municipality, 2007.
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a) Black

b) Coloured

63

c) Indian/Asian

d) White
Figure 24. Spatial Distribution of Women by Population Group per Province, 2007
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Figure 26 indicates that the provinces with the highest number of immigrants are Limpopo, Free
State, and the Western Cape. Limpopo is a border province with the countries of Botswana, Zimbabwe
and Mozambique, and as such it should not be surprising to contain large numbers of immigrants there.
Similarly, the Western Cape is a sought after destination for many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and
beyond. Results from running the Hot Spot Analysis tool on the distribution of black women, marital
status, and distribution of immigrants at municipality-level (spatial scale 3) are represented in Figure 27.
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a) Province

b) Municipality
Figure 25. Spatial Distribution of Singleness in South Africa, 2007.
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a) Province

b) Municipality
Figure 26. Spatial Distribution of Immigrants Living in South Africa, 2007.
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a) Clustering of Black Women in South Africa

b) Clustering of Singleness in South Africa
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c) Clustering of Immigrants in South Africa
Figure 27. Hot Spot Analysis for Stealing Women Grievance per District Municipality , 2007
There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) of black women in much of KwaZulu-Natal,
Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and Gauteng provinces (Figure 27.a). The eastern half of the Free State and
North West, as well as the northeastern part of the Eastern Cape also contain significant clustering of
high positive values. There is significant clustering of high negative values (blue) in most of the Western
Cape and the western half of the Northern Cape provinces. There is no significant clustering (yellow) of
black women represented in a band beginning in the eastern Northern Cape and western North West
province, extending southeastward through the western Free State and finishing in the western Eastern
Cape province.
There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) for singleness in KwaZulu-Natal as well as
the northeastern part of the Eastern Cape (Figure 27.b). Significant clustering of high negative values
(blue) again occurs in most of the Western Cape. There is no significant clustering (yellow) of singleness
across the rest of the country.
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Significant clustering of high positive values (red) for the number of immigrants occurs in the
northeastern most region of the Limpopo province (Figure 27.c). There is also a significant clustering of
high positive values around the city of Bloemfontein, in the Free State. Significant high negative values
(blue) occur in sporadic patches in the eastern Western Cape, northern Northern Cape, western North
West province, southern Mpumalanga, and northwest Gauteng. There is no significant clustering (yellow)
for the presence of immigrants across the rest of the country.
3. Spreading Disease
The spreading disease grievance indicates that the highest reported rates of death due to disease
occur in the easternmost half of the country (Figure 28). Of the reported total causes of death in 2007,
27.49% - 36.16% of the deaths were caused by disease in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. The Free
State and Eastern Cape contained rates of 25.19% - 27.48%, whereas the Northern Cape and North
West contained 18.94% - 25.18%. Gauteng and the Western Cape contained rates of 18.19% - 18.93%
whereas Limpopo province contained the smallest rates of 18.18%.
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Figure 28. Spatial Distribution of Spread of Disease Grievance by Province, 2007.
4. Spread of Crime
The spread of crime grievance was divided into five categories (Figure 29 a-e). The total reported
causes of death by assault (Figure 29.a) reveals that the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and Gauteng
contained the highest reported rates (0.36% - 0.97%). From highest to lowest, the crime by assault death
was as follows: Western Cape (0.25% - 0.35%), Free State and North West (0.20% - 0.24%), Limpopo
(0.15% - 0.19%), and the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga (0.11% - 0.14%).
2.32% - 2.65% of individuals polled in the Western Cape, Free State, and Mpumalanga had been
beaten up outside the home (Figure 29.b). From highest to lowest, distribution of individuals polled who
were beaten up outside the home was as follows: Gauteng (2.16% - 2.31%), Northern Cape and
KwaZulu-Natal (1.70% - 2.15%), North West and Eastern Cape (0.97% - 1.69%), and Limpopo (0.96%).
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11.85% - 15.59% of individuals polled in the Western Cape reported to have had possessions stolen
in 2007 (Figure 29.c). From highest to lowest, distribution of individuals polled who had things stolen was
as follows: Gauteng, North West, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape (8.83% - 11.84%), Free State and
Mpumalanga (6.79% - 8.82%), Northern Cape (5.87% - 6.78%), and Limpopo (5.86%).
4.68% - 5.08% of individuals polled in the Western Cape and Free State reported to have been
harassed outside the household in 2007 (Figure 29.d). From highest to lowest, the distribution of
individuals polled who had been harassed outside the household was as follows: Northern Cape and
Gauteng (3.91% - 4.67%), Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (3.34% - 3.90%), North West and
Mpumalanga (2.12% - 3.33%), and Limpopo (2.11%).
0.78% - 0.96% of individuals polled in the North West province reported to have been sexually
assaulted outside the household in 2007 (29.e). From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals
polled who had been sexually assaulted outside the household was as follows: Gauteng and the Eastern
Cape (0.54% - 0.77%), the Free State, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal (0.23% - 0.53%), the Western
Cape (0.21% - 0.22%), and the Northern Cape and Limpopo (0.17% - 0.20%).
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a) Assault

b) Beaten
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c) Theft

d) Harassed
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e) Sexually Assaulted
Figure 29. Spatial Distribution of Spread of Crime Grievance by Province, 2007.
5. Poor Service Delivery
The poor service delivery grievance was represented by three categories (Figure 30.a-c). 17.74% 29.19% of individuals polled in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were without access to an electricity
mains in the household (Figure 30.a). From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals polled without
access to an electricity mains was as follows: Gauteng (14.43% - 17.73%), the North West and Limpopo
(11.86% - 14.42%), the Northern Cape, Free State, and Mpumalanga (3.11% - 11.85%), and the Western
Cape (3.10%).
35.01% - 40.70% of individuals polled in KwaZulu-Natal were without access to piped water in 2007
(Figure 30.b). From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals polled without access to piped water
was as follows: the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (28.39% - 35.00%), the Northern Cape, North West,
and Limpopo (9.29% - 28.38%), the Free State (7.47% - 9.28%), and the Western Cape (6.58% - 7.46%).
97.41% - 99.20% of individuals polled in Gauteng and the Western Cape were without access to land
in 2007 (Figure 30.c). From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals polled without access to land
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was as follows: the Northern Cape and Free State (95.92% - 97.40%), the North West and Mpumalanga
(82.04% - 95.91%), Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal (60.18% - 82.03%), and the Eastern Cape (60.17%).

a) No Electricity

b) No Water
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c) No Land
Figure 30. Spatial Distribution of Poor Delivery Grievance by Province, 2007.
Opportunity Maps
1. Youth Bulge
The distribution of youth bulges across the country was represented at both spatial scales (Figure
31.a-b). The larger youth bulges were concentrated to the eastern half of the country. KwaZulu-Natal
and Limpopo provinces contained a youth bulge rate of 21.46% - 22.13% (Figure 31.a). From highest to
lowest the distribution of youth bulges across the country were as follows: the Eastern Cape and
Mpumalanga (20.71% - 21.45%), the Free State (19.58% - 20.70%), the Western Cape, Northern Cape,
and North West (17.96% - 19.57%), and Gauteng (17.95%).
There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) of youth bulges in much of KwaZulu-Natal,
northeastern Limpopo province, and northeastern Eastern Cape (Figure 32). There is significant
clustering of high negative values (blue) in the western half of the Western Cape as well as in the central
and northeastern parts of the North West province, most of Gauteng province, as well as the northeastern
part of the Free State. The remainder of the country experienced no significant clustering (yellow) of
youth bulges.
77

a) Province

b) Municipality
Figure 31. Spatial Distribution of Youth Bulge by Province and District Municipality, 2007.
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Figure 32. Hot Spot Analysis of Youth Bulge by District Municipality, 2007.
2. Poverty
The poverty opportunity was represented by three categories (Figure 33.a-c). 7.30% - 8.46% of
individuals polled in Gauteng and Limpopo provinces indicated that they had children living on the streets
(Figure 33.a). In descending order, the distribution of individuals polled who had children living on the
streets was as follows: the Free State, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal (5.07% - 7.29%), the Northern
Cape (4.14% - 5.06%), the North West and the Eastern Cape (2.27% - 4.16%), and the Western Cape
(2.26%).
42.15% - 50.10% of individuals polled in the Free State could not afford water in 2007 (Figure 33.b).
In descending order, the distribution of individuals polled who could not afford water was as follows:
Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape (26.42% - 42.14%), Gauteng and the Western Cape (16.04% -
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26.41%), Limpopo, the North West, and KwaZulu-Natal (12.44% - 16.03%), and the Eastern Cape
(12.43%).
81.08% - 86.30% of individuals polled in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape were without access to a car
in 2007 (Figure 33.c). In descending order, the distribution of individuals polled without a car was as
follows: KwaZulu-Natal (77.61% - 81.07%), the Northern Cape, the North West, the Free State, and
Mpumalanga (66.63% - 77.60%), Gauteng (64.05% - 66.62%), and the Western Cape (64.04%).
Modified Poverty Rate (MPR)
Poverty was further analyzed by geospatially representing MPR by province and district municipality
(Figure 34). The Eastern Cape and Limpopo province contained the highest ratios of MPR across the
study area. The ratios of individuals living under the MPR across the rest of the country are as follows:
68.81% - 75.82% of those living in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo province, 64.87% - 68.80% of those
living in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, 53.51% - 64.86% of those living in the Northern Cape, Free
State, and North West, 49.36% - 53.50% of those living in Gauteng, and 49.35% of those living in the
Western Cape. There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) of MPR in KwaZulu-Natal,
northeastern Limpopo province, and northeastern Eastern Cape (Figure 35). There is significant
clustering of high negative values (blue) in the western and southern halves of the Western Cape. The
remainder of the country experiences no significant clustering (yellow) of MPR.
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a) Street Children

b) Can‘t Afford Water
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c) Without a Car

Figure 33. Spatial Distribution of Poverty per Province, 2007.
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a) Province

b) District Municipality

Figure 34. Spatial Distribution of Modified Poverty Rate (MPR) Opportunity, 2007.
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Figure 35. Hot Spot Analysis of MPR by District Municipality, 2007.
Modeling Spatial Relationships
Prior to running the OLS model, exploratory regression analysis was carried out on the explanatory
variables (grievances and opportunities) in order to ensure that the most effective combination of
variables was used to support the dependent variable in the OLS equation. Exploratory Regression
Analysis was carried out on six explanatory variables; four grievances (unemployment rates, distribution
of black women, singleness, and distribution of foreigners) and two opportunities (MPR and youth bulge).
The results of running Exploratory Regression Analysis revealed the summary of variable significance
(Appendix A), possible variable redundancies (Appendix B), and the highest adjusted R-Squared results
(Appendix C).
The exploratory regression analysis indicates that unemployment rates (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) are
significant in explaining 93.55% of that variable towards the dependent variable. The number of black
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women (OLSFINAL.B_WOMEN) was significant in explaining 38.71% of that variable towards the
dependent variable. Singleness (OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS) was significant in explaining 54.84% of that
variable towards the dependent variable. The number of foreigners (OLS.FOREIGNERS) was significant
in explaining only 29.03% of that variable towards the dependent variable. Finally youth bulges
(OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) were significant in explaining 70.97% of that variable towards the dependent
variable. MPR (OLSFINAL.MPR) was significant in explaining only 25.81% of that variable towards the
dependent variable.
MPR was shown to cause the greatest variable redundancy with other covariates (93.75 with
singleness, 93.75 with unemployment, 93.75 with youth bulge, 81.25 with distribution of black women,
and 31.25 with distribution of foreigners). Due to the poor performance by this variable in the tests of
variable significance and variable redundancy, MPR was removed from the OLS equation.
The statistic used to determine the effectiveness of the OLS tool is the adjusted R-Squared statistic.
The highest adjusted R-Squared result from running the ERM was 0.68 (Appendix C). The adjusted RSquared value is used to measure model performance and reflects model complexity (the number of
variables) as it relates to the data, and consequently is a more accurate measure of model performance
(cite). Possible values range from 0.0 to 1.0. The adjusted R-Squared value of 0.68 indicates that this
predictive model explains approximately 68% of the variation in the dependent variable, or 68% of the
2008 xenophobic violence. The set of explanatory variables that were associated with producing this high
adjusted R-Squared result, in comparison to other combinations of variables that produced much lower
adjusted R-Squared results, where chosen to serve as the independent variables in the regression
equation. Exploratory Regression Analysis eliminated the redundant variables, (MPR) and the
distribution of black women, so that the OLS model could run as efficiently as possible. Results of the
analysis also revealed that the strongest combination of explanatory variables to measure variable
significance to the location of the 2008 violence were: unemployment rates (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL),
singleness, (OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS), distribution of foreigners (OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS), and youth
bulge (OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE). The equation used to run the OLS model across the study area is as
follows:
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2008 Locations of Xenophobic Violence =
+

0

+

1(OLSFINAL.UNEMPL)

3(OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS)

+

+

2(OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS)

4(OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE)

+

Figure 36 illustrates the distribution of residuals across the study area. Residuals are the
unexplained portion of the dependent variable, represented in the regression equation as the random
term error,

(ArcGIS Resource Center).

Figure 36. Map of OLS Residuals
Using known values for the dependent variable (Y) and known values for all of the explanatory
variables (the X‘s), the regression tool constructs an equation that will predict those known Y values as
well as possible. The difference between the observed Y values and the predicted Y values are known
as the residuals. The magnitude of the residuals from a regression equation is one measure of model fit.
Large residuals indicate a poor fit.
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In order to ensure that the residuals displayed in Figure 36 are random, and therefore not statistically
significant or spatially correlated, the Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans I) tool was run. The spatial
autocorrelation report produced a z-score of 0.32, thereby indicating that the residuals produced from the
OLS tool were indeed random and not statistically significant (Figure 37). So, although there are
over/under predictions represented as high z-scores (red) and low z-scores (blue), clustering of these
over/under predictions are random.
Appendix D and Appendix E reveal the results and diagnostics, respectively, of the OLS analysis.
The coefficient for each explanatory variable reflects both the strength and type of relationship the
explanatory variable has to the dependent variable. The coefficient reflects the expected change in the
dependent variable for every 1 unit change in the associated explanatory variable, holding all other
variables constant. The results are interpreted as follows: a 0.000035 increase in the number of
xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional person unemployed (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) across the
study area, a 0.000021 increase in the number of xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional
single person (OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS) across the study area, a 0.000169 decrease in the number of
xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional foreigner (OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS) across the study
area, and a 0.000089 decrease in the number of xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional youth
bulge increase (OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) across the study area. The OLS diagnostics report reveals
that the Koenker (BP) Statistic is statistically significant (0.000064*). Since this statistic is statistically
significant, the robust probabilities are used to assess explanatory variable statistical significance. An
explanatory variable associated with a statistically significant coefficient is important to the regression
model if causal theory supports a valid relationship with the dependent variable, which is true in this case.
The Joint Wald Statistic is a measure of overall model statistical significance. The null hypothesis for this
test is that the explanatory variables in the model are not effective. For a 95% confidence level, a p-value
(probability) smaller than 0.05 indicates a statistically significant model. The associated p-value for the
Joint Wald Statistic (0.000000*) is smaller than 0.05, and as such, indicates a statistically significant
model. This also reveals that the null hypothesis is incorrect, and that the explanatory variables in the
model are effective.
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Figure 37. Spatial Autocorrelation Report of OLS Residuals.
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Correlation Analysis of Explanatory Variables

Figure 38. Explanatory Variables Scatterplot Matrix
Correlation analyses, and their associated graphics depicted in Figure 38 test the strength of the
relationship between the explanatory variables. The highlighted set of explanatory variables in Figure 38
(Youth Bulge and MPR) indicates a very strong positive relationship between both variables. In this case,
the more individuals living under the modified poverty line, the greater the youth bulge. It should be
important to note that there is neither a positive or negative relationship between the 2008 xenophobic
events (Events) and any of the six explanatory variables. Similarly, when Foreigners is used as part of a
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correlation analysis, the resulting relationship is neither positive nor negative. All other variables,
however, produce strong positive relationships when correlated.
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VI.

DISCUSSION
The data derived and discussed from the methodology and results sections of this study indicate that

it is possible to geospatially represent grievances and opportunities which lead to xenophobic violence in
South Africa. This study builds on previous research by targeting the importance of grievance and
opportunity as contributory motives towards xenophobic violence. The following discussion section
explains how the analytical processes carried out in this study are effective in measuring the propensity
for xenophobic violence in South Africa.
By obtaining census data representative of group grievance and group opportunity, it was possible to
identify the spatial distribution of each across the study area, represented in each case by quantitative
thematic maps. The creation of the grievance and opportunity maps served as the first level of analysis
of the geographic phenomenon that is xenophobic violence. This first level of analysis began to answer
the question of ―where‖ grievances and opportunities are distributed across the study area. Grievance
and opportunity magnitude were also addressed through the analysis.
After each grievance and opportunity was cartographically represented, the second level of analysis
could be carried out through assessing the degree of significant statistical relationship between EA units
representing each grievance and opportunity. This level of analysis answered the question of ―where‖
spatial patterns are distributed across the study area. The ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) Model
identified the geographic locations that contained the highest and lowest degree of clustering.
The first two levels of analysis identified the intensity of distribution of the grievances and
opportunities as well as the distance relationships between the grievances and opportunities. These two
levels of analysis addressed ―where‖ the data was spatially located across the study area. The next
logical question involves the ―why‖. Using regression analysis, the spatial relationships represented
during the first two levels of analysis were modeled to create a regression equation revealing the degree
to which the hypothesis of this study is correct. The utilization of regression analysis helped explain the
inherent factors behind the observed spatial patterns identified during the first two levels of analysis.
Modeling spatial relationships allows the regression analysis to be useful in model prediction.
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Regression analysis was chosen as the final level of statistical analysis for two primary reasons. The
first reason was the ability to model a geographic phenomenon (xenophobic violence), and to better
understand it and possibly use that understanding to effect policy or make decisions about appropriate
actions to take. The basic objective here was to measure the extent that changes in one or more
variables jointly affect changes in another. The second reason was the ability regression analysis
possesses in analyzing and exploring a hypothesis. Utilization of a regression equation in this case
tested the strength of the explanatory variables to best predict the dependent variable modeled; the
dependent variable being the locations of the xenophobic violence of 2008 and the explanatory variables
being grievances and opportunities. The analysis revealed which explanatory variables were the
strongest and weakest variables in explaining the 2008 xenophobic violence.
For an OLS model to perform successfully, an adjusted R-Squared result of at least 0.80 is expected
(ArcGIS Resource Center). The overall adjusted R-Squared result of this OLS model was only 0.68. The
OLS map indicated that there were clustering (high and low) of residuals across the study area. The
variance inflation factor (VIF) measures redundancy among explanatory variables. Explanatory variables
with VIF values larger than 7.5 indicate that two more of the variables are telling the same story and
should be removed from the regression model (ArcGIS Resource Center). The VIF for three of the four
variables used in the regression equation were much larger than 7.5 (Appendix C). Results of the OLS
diagnostic (Appendix E) revealed a significant Jarque-Bera p-value statistic. This indicates that the OLS
residuals were not normally distributed and a key variable is likely missing. In order to identify the cause
of these statistical phenomena, a scatterplot matrix of the OLS residuals was created (Figure 38). The
scatterplot matrix revealed that most of the variables shared a positive relationship with one another.
However, the matrix also revealed that none of the variables held any type of correlation relationship
(positive or negative) with the 2008 event locations (Events). Similarly, none of the variables held any
type of correlation relationship (positive or negative) with the number of foreigners (Foreigners)
explanatory variable. This indicates that individual explanatory variables alone are insufficient in
explaining the 2008 event locations. There must be a combination of explanatory variables present.
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Appendix D reveals the coefficient strengths of the explanatory variables used in the OLS model.
Results of the OLS model indicate that a 0.000035 increase in the number of xenophobic attacks is
expected for each additional person unemployed (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) across the study area. The
dependent variable represents one unit. Therefore, to determine the number of unemployed persons
needed to represent an additional xenophobic event, the dependent variable can be divided by the
coefficient. This calculation can be repeated for each of the other explanatory variables to determine the
actual number of additional persons per each explanatory variable needed to positively or negatively
influence the number of xenophobic events. For the distribution of unemployed persons
(OLSFINAL.UNEMPL), the number of additional unemployed persons required to represent an additional
xenophobic event are: 1/0.000035 = 28,571. Similarly for the distribution of singleness
(OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS), the number of additional single persons required to represent an additional
xenophobic event are: 1/ 0.000021 = 47,619. Conversely, an additional number of foreigners
(OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS) of 1/0.000169 = 5,917, is required to decrease the number of xenophobic
events by one across the study area whereas an additional number of youth representing youth bulges
(OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) of, 1/0.000089 = 11,235, is required to decrease the number of xenophobic
events by one across the study area.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS
There will continue to be a need to constantly readdress high risk xenophobic violence monitoring
across urban centers of the country due to the facts that the coalitions that were formed in response to
the violence of 2008 have faltered and various organizations have since retreated back to working on
their core business without reflecting on how to integrate the issues facing refugees and migrants into
their programs and goals. Few, if any, non-refugee organizations have subsequently formally integrated
xenophobia, migrants and refugees into their day-to-day work. (Parsley, 2010). Before summarizing the
successes of this research, one must note specific data limitations within this study.
Data Limitations
There were limitations in the census datasets used to represent group grievances and opportunities.
First of all, CS 2007 cannot act as a replacement for the Census. Attempts were made by STATSSA to
adjust measurements to a best estimate, but these attempts resulted in some error. Most of the
adjustments made by STATSSA could not produce usable estimates of counts in some municipalities
(Community Survey Basic Results). The exception of better estimates was observed in densely
populated municipalities like metro areas. Measurements in terms of proportion is much less susceptible
to random error than counts (numbers), and as a consequence, CS 2007 gives useful information for
estimating proportions, averages or ratios for smaller area domains (Community Survey Basic Results).
Using CS 2007, reliance should be minimalized on using numbers for variables broken down at
geographical hierarchy Level 3 (population, age, group, etc…). However, the aggregated total number
per municipality provides more reliable estimates (Census 2007 Basic Results). In order to work around
this data limitation, datasets used to produce the group grievances and opportunities maps were all
normalized to produce percentages or rates, thus ensuring that proportions were used over counts at a
scale of Level 3.
Reliable datasets on numbers representing internal migrants within South Africa are contentiously
debatable. Therefore, one of the datasets constituting the ―Stealing Women‖ grievance (number of
foreigners living in the country in 2007), should be viewed as representing a very general distribution of
the true numbers and clusters of foreigners residing in the country. Until more accurate and reliable
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methodologies are developed to monitor the number of migrants dwelling within the country at any given
time, this grievance will continue to prove difficult to fully represent.
Significance of Findings
Past research reveals that a positive relationship does exist between group grievances and
opportunities with civil conflict. This research successfully demonstrates that census data is a viable
source of data to represent group grievances and opportunities for conflict. Furthermore, this research
reveals that it is possible to cartographically represent those grievances and opportunities, and that once
mapped, the degree to which grievances and opportunities influence events of xenophobic violence can
be analyzed. Once mapped and analyzed, comparison can then take place with known events.
The significance of this research rests in the ability to use grievances and opportunities as inputs in a
predictive model to measure the coefficient strength of explanatory variables of a significant xenophobic
event. This research proves that not only is it possible to map census data to represent group grievance
and opportunity, but that it is a worthwhile foundation upon which conflict prediction models should be
built. The overarching goal of this research was to geospatially represent the distribution of the causes of
the 2008 xenophobic violence, and to identify the legitimacy of the grievances South African nationals
have voiced in response to African non-nationals entering their country. This research was successful in
acquiring datasets representative of group grievances and opportunities. Once the datasets were
acquired, this study proved successful in answering where each grievance and opportunity was
distributed across the study area. The study was successful in creating a predictive conflict model that
identified two grievances with positive correlations with xenophobic events; unemployment and
singleness.
This study contributes to the global research community in two ways. The first is to global conflict
studies. Group grievances and opportunities are associated with conflict events. Applying geostatistical
analyses to these factors allows researchers to understand where, how, and why group grievances and
opportunities influence significant conflict events. The second is in part to the extensive research that has
been carried out in analyzing the xenophobic violence of 2008 in South Africa, and in part to the
continued research taking place within the country to continuously map and monitor the xenophobic
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landscape across South Africa with the sole goal to predict where and when future xenophobic events
might occur.
Future Research
From October 10 – 31 of 2011, the third major census in South Africa was carried out since the
advent of democracy (cite). With the release of the census data to occur at the end of 2012, accurate,
up-to-date census data will be available representing the various group grievances and opportunities
highlighted in this study. It would be imperative to deploy the predictive model used in this study to
identify the geospatial distribution of group grievances and opportunities in South Africa in order to gain
an accurate picture of how the xenophobic landscape appears today.
This research exposed the need to redefine instances of xenophobic violence. Employing the
predictive model used in this study with a deployment of a continuously monitoring crisis mapping system
would allow for more thorough day-to-day monitoring of group grievances and opportunities. The conflict
monitoring system could be delivered through an open/crowd source platform, such as Ushahidi, that
would serve to continuously monitor high risk conflict zones across the country.
Researchers indicate that it‘s not a matter of ―if‖ but ―when‖ an event similar to the outburst of
xenophobic violence of 2008 will reoccur. May a lack of preparedness not find itself on the list of
grievances and opportunities that lead to human suffering.
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